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“SOMEONE’S GOT TO LOOK OUT FOR THE PEOPLE”: EXPLORING DONALD TRUMP
AND ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ’S ONLINE PERFORMANCE OF POPULISM AND
IMMIGRATION RHETORIC

Taylor P. Koopman, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2020
This thesis examines the performance of populism by a right- and left-wing politician in
the digital sphere during the peak of the immigration crisis in 2019 using the lens of Moffitt’s
populism as performance theory (performer, stage, and audience) and Baldwin-Philippi’s four
methods of ‘centering the people.’ My findings show that Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s
performances of populism condemn the degradation of the U.S. and portray themselves as
immigration warriors. Trump uses exclusionary rhetoric to advocate putting “America First,” and
Ocasio-Cortez expresses inclusionary rhetoric to develop an “America for All,” in a way that
informs their performances of conservative and democratic-socialist populism to center ‘the
people.’ Specifically, Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s performance centers ‘the people’ by: speaking
to them using retweets of their own messaging, utilizing data-driven facts, and using Spanish (in
Ocasio-Cortez’s case); engaging them by visually showing engagement through photos and
videos (only Ocasio-Cortez used this tactic); styling oneself on them through both moral outrage
and compassion, and Ocasio-Cortez voicing support for an inclusive U.S., while Trump argued
for a protected U.S.; and finally highlighting their voices through retweeting verified users to
showcase support for not only themselves, but their policy positions as well. These findings
demonstrate that populism is a form of strategic communication, a tool for populist politicians to
use to not only traditionally unite ‘the people’ against an enemy, but also for a cause. These
findings also expand on left-wing populism to show how formerly excluded out-group
immigrants may be invited to become part of ‘the people’ through inclusionary rhetoric.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 2000s, the populist phenomenon has infiltrated various democracies
around the world, reaching a global high point in 2010 (Kyle & Meyer, 2020) and remaining
steadily prevalent in politics ever since. In 2019, nearly 20 populist leaders held executive office
around the world (Kyle & Meyer, 2020). The election of U.S. President Donald Trump in 2016
reflected this global trend and represented a major shift in the way politicians in the U.S. present
themselves and communicate with ‘the people.’ Politicians are increasingly compelled to ‘speak
in a more popular idiom and to court popular support more assiduously’ (Blumbler & Kavanagh,
1999 p. 220). Trump and other populist politicians are finding electoral success in pitting ‘the
people’ against ‘the elite.’ Even though populism has been called a threat to democracy (Mounk,
2018) and has long been thought of as a ‘dirty word’ or an insult to be thrown at politicians we
don’t like (Moffitt, 2016 p. 11), the phenomenon continues to become ‘mainstream’ in the
political landscape (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Meny & Surel, 2002).
During his presidential campaign, Trump used several populist tactics to unite his base,
or ‘the people,’ to rise to power. These tactics ranged from his controversial slogan, ‘Make
America Great Again,’ to attacking and delegitimizing the media as ‘fake news,’ and claims that
he would ‘drain the swamp’ of Washington, D.C., among others (Goodheart, 2017; Naim, 2017;
Winberg, 2017). In both Trump’s campaign and subsequent presidency, these types of populist
tactics were of particular significance in relation to his stance on immigration and were reflected
throughout his rhetoric and policies (see Appendix A for a timeline of Trump’s immigration
policies and events). Trump was famously quoted by the Washington Post in 2018, deriding
protections for immigrants and refugees, claiming they are “people from s--thole countries,” and
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later said immigrants aren’t people, but “animals.” Soon after that, immigration and human rights
issues began to emerge in the media as family separation policies led to reports of thousands of
children being detained in inhumane conditions at the border.
In response to Trump’s election and exclusionary rhetoric and policies, the 2018 midterm
elections brought a ‘blue wave’ of Democrats (Enten, 2018; Siddiqui, 2018; Yglesias, 2018) particularly females and people of color (Cooney, 2018; Milligan, 2018; Zhou, 2018) - to
positions of power throughout the nation. One emergent star of this blue wave was a 28-year-old
from the Bronx, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. As reports of conditions at the border continued to
come to light, Ocasio-Cortez became one of Trump’s biggest opponents. The congresswoman
also used populist tactics in her campaign and became a defender for immigrants and those
deemed as ‘the other.’ Even though Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s rhetoric and policy positions are
on opposite ends of the political spectrum, Ocasio-Cortez has consistently been compared to
Trump by the media based on her use of social media (Nguyen, 2018; Tauberg, 2018) and has
been named a populist by several journalists (Baker, 2019; Manchester, 2018; O’falt, 2018; Zito,
2019).
Politicians such as Trump and Ocasio-Cortez can use social media - particularly Twitter as a means to gain unmediated access to voters, promote themselves and their policies, and
communicate personally and directly with the electorate (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010;
Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Populist actors can build on these advantages through social media
and create a feeling of ‘social presence’ (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese,
2013), solidifying the connection between the populist and ‘the people’ or ‘like-minded others’
(Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Many credit social media as the reason Trump won the presidency,
and both Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s tweets appear in the news regularly for their inflammatory
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or controversial subject matter. With the growing interest in populism, media, and
communication (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Stromback, & de Vreese, 2017), and the rising
importance of social media as a means of political communication, it is more important than ever
to explore the relationship between populism and social media.
Few studies have focused on the performance of populism, and even fewer have studied
the performance of populism on social media. Since most populists of note have been of the
conservative right-wing (i.e. - Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, etc.), most studies
investigating populism focus on right-wing politicians and parties (Bos, van der Brug, & de
Vreese, 2011; Esser, Stepinska, & Hopmann 2017; Stier, Posch, Bleier & Strohmaier 2017).
However, as Ernst, Engesser, Buchel, Blassnig, & Esser (2017) found, populism is not only a
right-wing phenomenon; in fact, populist communication is stronger for those politicians at the
‘extremes of the political spectrum.’ Therefore, this thesis aims to examine not only the
performance of populism on social media, but populism as performed by a left-wing democraticsocialist and a right-wing conservative, addressing this significant gap in the literature and
adding to our understanding of the concept of populism as a spectrum. There is much focus on
right-wing populism in academia and the media (Groshek & Engelbert, 2013; Heiss & Matthes,
2017; Kramer, 2017; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Stier, Posch, Bleier & Strohmaier, 2017). However,
less is known about left-wing populism (March, 2017; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Stavrakakis &
Katsambekis, 2014), how it is performed on social media, and how it may differ from a rightwing performance of populism. With the increase in populist politicians of varying parties
around the globe, coupled with the solidifying prominence of the role social media plays in
politics, it is important to understand not only right-wing, but also left-wing politicians’ use of
populism and if or how it differs from their counterparts.
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To understand the performance of populism on social media by both left- and right-wing
politicians, this thesis will focus specifically on the rhetoric used by Ocasio-Cortez and Trump
relating to immigration on Twitter during the height of the 2019 immigration crisis when reports
of human rights violations began to surface in the media and dominated the political
conversation in the U.S. Ocasio-Cortez represents the left-wing populist movement in the U.S.
and is both an avid and engaging social media user, and is a significant advocate for immigration
rights. In juxtaposition to Ocasio-Cortez, Donald Trump represents the “America first” rightwing populist movement and is thus vehemently anti-immigrant. He is also a highly frequent
user of Twitter and is one of the top ten most followed users on the platform (Boyd, 2020).
Populists may focus on several various anti-establishment or socioeconomic issues, such as
corruption and economic inequality (e.g. – Occupy Wall Street in 2011) or healthcare reform, as
well as moral and cultural issues like religious traditionalism or crime when communicating with
‘the people.’ However, as Kyle & Meyer (2020) found, cultural populism is the most dominant
form of populism today due to the rise of anti-immigration and anti-minority movements among
populist leaders and parties. By focusing on the highly relevant issue of immigration, this thesis
aims to gain a deeper understanding of populism as performed by contrasting ideologies and how
they embody the different U.S. American values of ‘the people’ at the core of the immigration
debate. Therefore, in this study I conduct a comparative case study of both Ocasio-Cortez and
Trump’s use of Twitter to understand how they use pro- or anti-immigrant rhetoric to perform
left- and right-wing populism to their audience, or ‘the people.’ This study draws on Moffitt’s
(2016) theory of populism as a political style and Baldwin-Philippi’s (2018) four methods of
‘centering the people’ while performing populism on social media.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Background on Immigration Case Study
Immigration in the U.S.
Immigration has become a key focal point of the U.S. political conversation and is often
rife with controversy, but the U.S. has long been considered a nation of immigrants. As of 2019,
the Migration Policy Institute found “the United States has, by far, the largest migrant population
in the world – about four times that of … the two countries with the next largest amount of
immigrants” (Bolter, 2019a). In fact, the U.S. hosts approximately 51 million immigrants
(United Nations, 2019), making up nearly 14% of the nation’s population (Radford, 2019).
While a vast majority (77%) of immigrants are in the U.S. lawfully (Radford, 2019), there are up
to 12 million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. today (Bolter, 2019b). More than half
of these immigrants are Mexican (Bolter, 2019b), but the undocumented population arriving
from Mexico has declined by 1.3 million since 2010 (Warren, 2019). Perhaps consequently, the
number of Mexicans apprehended at the 2,000-mile long southern border has also fallen (Passel
& Cohn, 2019), with apprehensions of non-Mexicans far outnumbering the former for the past
four years (Gramlich & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). As Mexican immigration dropped, the number
of undocumented immigrants coming to the U.S. from other Central American and Asian
countries have risen substantially (Passel & Cohn, 2019). Overall, the majority of immigrants
crossing the border into the U.S. are from an amalgamation of all other countries, not from
Mexico (Passel & Cohn, 2019).
Besides documented and undocumented immigrants, other migrant-types of import are
refugees and asylum seekers hoping to find safety in the U.S. Though similar, the key difference
5

between refugees and asylum seekers is that the former nearly always apply for resettlement
within the U.S. while outside of the country, and the latter apply after already arriving at a port
of entry to the country. Since the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program was established in
1980, 3 million refugees – more than in any other country – have been successfully settled in the
U.S. (Radford, 2019). In 2020, a maximum of 18,000 refugees will be allowed to enter the U.S.
under the Trump administration’s new proposed refugee acceptance ceiling, down from the
previous year’s historically low cap of 30,000 refugees (Schor, 2019). This would be the lowest
number of refugees accepted and resettled since the refugee program began, and reflects the
U.S.’s newly lost status as the world’s top country for refugee acceptance – the U.S. resettled
more refugees each year than all other countries combined up until 2017 (Radford & Connor,
2019). Interestingly, even though refugee acceptance declined, asylum acceptance rates
increased 46% from 26,509 in 2017 to 38,687 in 2018 (Mossaad, 2019). These statistics serve as
a basis for understanding the state of immigration in the U.S. today, and demonstrate both the
complexity and importance of analysing such an issue in this thesis.
The History of Immigration in the U.S. (1790 – 2016)
Though the current state of immigration is focused on immigrants entering the country
across the southern border from Mexico and other Central American countries, the U.S. has
historically been touted as a nation of immigrants from all over the globe – particularly since the
country was founded by a wave of unrestricted European immigrants who came to this new land
seeking freedom from religious persecution. However, in the U.S.’s early days the acceptance of
immigrants was permitted by the whiteness of their skin. After the United States of America was
founded in 1776, Congress passed The Naturalization Act of 1790, allowing any free white
person of “good character,” who had been living in the country for two or more years to apply
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for citizenship. Non-white persons were denied citizenship and subsequent basic constitutional
protections. It wasn’t until the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the later adopted Citizenship Clause
in the 14th Amendment, that all people born or naturalized in the U.S. were declared citizens
regardless of race. Nevertheless, the U.S.’s immigration laws continued to harbour explicit bias
against certain nationalities. For example, Chinese workers were banned entirely from entering
the country under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the Immigration Act of 1917 included
a “barred zone” prohibiting immigration from particular nations in the Asia-Pacific area. Ewing
(2012) notes that these “exclusionary immigration laws coincided with unprecedented levels of
immigration to the United States,” as more than 30 million immigrants arrived in the U.S.
between 1870 and 1930. This surge in immigration led to the birth of nativism in the U.S., and
new anti-immigration parties, such as the “Know Nothing Party.”
Regardless of anti-immigrant positions and policies that occurred throughout the years,
the U.S. continued to hold a reputation as a safe haven for immigrants and a land of opportunity
(i.e. – “the American Dream”). This is perhaps most clearly reflected by the erection of the
Statue of Liberty on Ellis Island in 1886, which welcomed immigrants with these famous words,
“Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free / The wretched
refuse of your teeming shore / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me / I lift my lamp
beside the golden door” (Liberty Ellis Foundation). According to the Liberty Ellis Foundation,
“between 1880 and 1930, over 27 million people entered the United States - about 12 million
through Ellis Island.” However, like before, this influx of immigrants ultimately led to antiimmigration backlash. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, limiting the number of
immigrants allowed into the country yearly through nationality quotas, favouring immigrants
from Northern and Western European countries and putting other countries at a disadvantage, or
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excluding them altogether (History.com, 2018). Consequently, the limits imposed increased the
number of undocumented immigrants attempting to cross the border and thus, the U.S. Border
Patrol was established that same year (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2018).
It was not until World War II that the tide began to turn in favour of immigrants. The
damages caused by war led the United States to begin accepting and resettling refugees. In 1942,
labor shortages led to the Bracero Program which gave temporary acceptance to Mexican
agricultural workers, and in 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act finally ended the exclusion of Asian
immigrants to the U.S. Additionally, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ended the
racially biased national origin quotas, which President Lyndon B. Johnson called “unAmerican,” and replaced it with a new system based on family reunification and skilled
immigrants. Further still, President Ronald Reagan granted amnesty to more than 3 million
undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. under the 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Act, and finally in
2012 President Barack Obama signed the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Act
which temporarily shielded some Dreamers – undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S.
illegally by their parents as children – from deportation. However, the tide turned once more for
hopeful migrants when President Trump was elected and his immigration policies began to take
effect. See Appendix B for a more comprehensive description of the U.S.’s immigration history
up until this point.
Immigration Under President Trump (2017 – Present)
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump proposed several anti-immigration policies,
such as building a border wall that Mexico must pay for, deporting all undocumented immigrants
using a new deportation force, and banning Muslim immigrants from entering the U.S.
(McCaskill, 2016). Once he became President, he immediately began putting his anti-immigrant
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policies into effect, drawing parallels to the anti-immigration legislation of the past (Alvarez,
2017; Kramer, 2018). In the first few days as president, Trump signed three executive orders
(Zoppo, Proenca Santos, & Hudgins, 2017); one to punish sanctuary cities and stop them from
receiving federal money (which was later determined to be unconstitutional), another to begin
“immediate construction” on a border wall, and the other to ban travel and immigration from six
majority Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia). This was the first of
three attempts at what was deemed the “Muslim ban.” The ban was initially blocked by federal
courts until a later iteration added North Korea and Venezuela to the list of banned countries,
making it not exclusively a ban on Muslims, and was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in
2018 (Wolf, 2018). Also, under the newfound Trump administration, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) established the “controversial” Victims of Immigration Crime
Engagement Office to highlight crimes committed by undocumented immigrants (Laughland &
Siddiqui, 2017), even though undocumented immigrants are considerably less likely to commit
crime than native-born citizens (Bersani, 2012; Butcher & Morrison Piehl, 2008; Light & Miller,
2018; Nowrasteh, 2018).
Later in the first year of the Trump presidency, the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans was rescinded, leaving millions of undocumented parents vulnerable to deportation,
and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was repealed as well. The repeal was
blocked by the courts though, and DACA was later reinstated (Savage, 2019). The following
year resulted in more anti-immigration laws out of the administration as “caravans” of thousands
of migrants from Central America began making their way to the U.S. (Escalon, 2019; Lind,
2018). Trump sent National Guard troops to the southern border in an attempt to secure the
border (Copp, 2018), and in April adopted a “zero tolerance” policy for all undocumented
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immigrants entering the country aimed at deterring future immigrants from coming to the U.S.
(Gonzales, 2018; Kopan, 2018). This controversial policy sparked a public outcry as reports
emerged about family separations – and the government’s inability to track these families –
happening at the border (Shoichet, 2019). In June, a “tent city” for detained children separated
from their parents at the border became operational with several others following, and reports of
sexual, physical and mental abuse arose in the media as time went on (Grabell, Sanders, &
Pensel, 2018; Hals & Cooke, 2018; Silva, 2018; Smith & Bogado, 2018). An Arizona border
detention center was even recently deemed unconstitutional by a federal court after finding it
didn’t meet basic human needs “for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower, food that meets
acceptable dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessment performed by a medical
professional” within 48 hours of arrival (National Immigration Law Center, 2020).
Though Trump briefly reversed the family separation policy in one month prior, in July a
federal judge formally ordered the administration to stop separating most families at the border
and to reunite parents and children who were already separated (Jarrett, 2018) – a difficult feat
for officials as the parents were already deported. However, families were still being separated
and nearly 15,000 children were being held at the border in nearly maximum capacity facilities
(Burnett, 2018). Matters at the border continued to decline throughout the end of 2018 as Trump
announced his intention to end birthright citizenship (Hirschfeld Davis, 2018), asylum-seekers
attempting to cross the border were shot with tear gas and pepper balls by border officers (Smith,
2018), and two children died in separate incidents after they were taken into custody by the U.S.
Border Patrol (Ansari, 2018; Hernandez, Flores, & Aleaziz, 2018). The government even shut
down after border wall funding could not be agreed upon at Trump’s demand (Andrews &
Peterson, 2018). The government didn’t reopen until February 15, 2019, after the border wall
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received a portion of the funding requested and Trump declared a state of emergency to access
the rest of the funding necessary (Baker, 2019) – a decision that would later be ruled a violation
of federal law (Williams, 2019).
In 2019, more reports of immigrant deaths began to surface. Video evidence showed a
16-year-old boy from Guatemala collapsing to his death in a Border Patrol holding cell in May
after Border Patrol agents and health care workers “missed increasingly obvious signs that his
condition was perilous” (Moore, Schmidt, & Jameel, 2019). NBC News reported in June that
“twenty-four immigrants have died in ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] custody…at
least four others…died shortly after being released” (Rappleye & Riordan Seville, 2019). June
also brought the story of a Salvadoran father and daughter drowning in the Rio Grande while
attempting to cross the border to light (Gallon, Melgar, & Almasy, 2019), and in September
another drowning occurred when a mother and her toddler attempted the same journey across the
river (Dickerson & Addario, 2019). Conditions for migrants remained bleak throughout 2019,
and continued on into 2020. In the most recent immigration development, the Supreme Court
voted in favour of the Trump administration to make it more difficult for low-income immigrants
to come and try to remain legally in the U.S. See Appendix B for a more detailed description of
Trump’s immigration policies and major related events.
The Immigration Debate in the U.S.
The Trump administration’s exclusionary stance on immigration is distinctly similar to
earlier times of isolationism and nationalism in the U.S.’s history. Historian Margaret MacMillan
(2018) believes the current state of immigration is simply another turn in the country’s 200-year
long history of “flip-flopping between isolationism and engagement,” and continued by making
the analogy that Trump’s immigration policies are clearly isolationist, like a “fortress that has
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pulled up its drawbridge.” Isolationism has roots in the U.S. going as far back as pre-independence
colonial times, and is characterized by a reluctance to accept responsibility or involvement in the
affairs of other nations and seeks to devote all efforts to the advancement of one’s own nation
(Longley, 2019). The 20th century saw the end of isolationism as a consequence of World War I
and the Great Depression (The Week, 2016), but after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Longley
(2019) said “a spirit of nationalism unseen in America since World War II, [and] the ensuing War
on Terror may have resulted in the return of American isolationism.” This ideology was furthered
in mainstream politics when newly-elected Trump spouted his isolationist campaign slogan,
“America First” (Hillyard, 2016) in a victory speech, and is now reflected throughout the
Republican party’s stance on immigration (Republican National Committee, 2020), which reads:
Immigrants have undeniably made great contributions to our country, but any
national immigration policy must put the interests of our existing citizens first. To
start, our border must be absolutely secured and illegal immigration must be
stopped. Then, and only then, can we begin reforming our system in a way that lets
new immigrants experience the American Dream without causing economic
hardships to American citizens.
It is important to note that Trump’s isolationist policies, coupled with his own admittance as a
nationalist, have garnered Trump much criticism due to nationalism’s strong association with
Nazis, the “alt-right,” and white supremacy (Forgey, 2018; Goldberg, 2019; Greve & Ho, 2019).
Closely related to isolationism, nationalism is a political system primarily driven by cultural
associations, such as language or race, that promotes the superior nation at the expense of inferior
others (Sraders, 2018). Therefore, restricting legal immigration, reducing the number of asylum
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seekers and refugees, and erecting a border wall are all ways Trump attempts to preserve a U.S.
without perceived cultural detriments.
Contrary to the exclusionary ideologies of nationalism and isolationism, globalism
represents the more inclusionary idea that events in one country cannot be separated from those in
another (“Globalism,” n.d.). Trump explicitly denounced this ideology in 2019, saying globalism
causes U.S. citizens to “ignore their own national interests” (Borger, 2019), and back in 2016 he
asserted voters were making a choice “between [his] Americanism” and Hillary Clinton’s “corrupt
globalism” during the presidential election (Trump, 2016). However, globalists maintain there are
several benefits to integrating the U.S. with other nations, such as “a greater variety of less
expensive goods, greater opportunities for travel and cultural exchange, a more cosmopolitan
world” (Yates & Murphy, 2019). Perhaps most notably though is the globalist viewpoint that all
people matter regardless of where they come from or where they live, and that universal freedom
and human rights are achievable for all (Carpio, 2019). This sentiment can be seen in the
Democratic party’s stance on immigration (Democratic National Committee, 2020), which reads:
Democrats know the importance of our country’s history as a nation of immigrants.
We honor our fundamental values by treating all people who come to the United
States with dignity and respect, and we always seek to embrace — not to attack —
immigrants.
Though the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group (2018) found immigration is “one of the
most divisive major issues among American voters” today, this wasn’t always the case.
Democratic and Republican voters were nearly in agreeance on immigration in 2005 (Thompson,
2018), but today the parties are fractured; 83% of Democrats think immigrants strengthen the
country with their hard work and talents, with only 11% believing they burden the country, as
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opposed to 38% of Republicans who say immigrants strengthen the country, while nearly half
(49%) say they burden it (Jones, 2019). Reflecting these attitudes, “illegal immigration” was the
nation’s number one issue for Republicans during the 2018 midterm elections, but was among the
lowest issues for Democrats (Benen, 2018).
Pro- and Anti-Immigration Rhetoric
It is clear that the complex immigration debate in the U.S. continues to evolve with the
changing times and increasing globalization. To fully understand the current situation on
immigration, and the two viewpoints on the issue, it is important to examine the language used
when expressing these views. Historically, anti-immigrant rhetoric frames immigration as “us vs.
them,” using terms like “illegal immigrant,” or “alien” to push for border security and
comprehensive immigration reform (Yu Hsi Lee, 2013), and evoke prejudice against immigrants
due to their associations with perceived threat and danger to the U.S. American people (Pearson,
2010), whether this is via job loss, decreased government resources, increased crime or lower
standards of living (Gonyea, 2018). The key argument is that by keeping the threat out, the U.S.
will be safe (Kafura & Hammer, 2019). According to historian Tyler Anbinder (2019), the main
anti-immigration arguments include:
[Immigrants] bring crime; they import poverty; they spread disease; they don’t
assimilate; they corrupt our politics; they steal our jobs; they cause our taxes to
increase; they’re a security risk; their religion is incompatible with American
values; they can never be “true Americans.”
Further, immigrants’ legal or illegal status is often conflated as a cultural or economic menace to
U.S. culture (Delgado, 2003), and depicts undocumented workers, particularly those from
Mexico, in a demeaning manner (Ono & Sloop, 2001). When speaking of immigration, anti-
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immigration proponents use terms associated with disease (i.e. – containment or contagion), war
(invasion), animals (i.e. – swarm or stampede), and water (i.e. – surge or flood) to invoke anxiety
toward migrants (Kazmi, 2018). Shattell & Villalba (2008) argue that much of anti-immigration
rhetoric is “veiled racism,” which the Southern Poverty Law Center (2019) says has contributed
to a record number of 1,020 active hate groups in the U.S. – a 30% increase over the past four
years, “roughly coinciding with Trump’s campaign and presidency.” This is illustrated by
Fritze’s (2019) reporting that Trump used contentious words like, "predator," "invasion," "alien,"
"killer," "criminal" and "animal" more than 500 times over the course of his presidency when
referring to immigrants. Trump also frequently overgeneralizes entire groups of people by
associating Mexican immigrants with crime and drugs, and even calling them “rapists,” as well
as perpetuating the idea that immigrants and refugees pose a health risk, such as when he
claimed all Haitians have AIDS (Anbinder, 2019). Some observers note that by using language
like this, Trump is responsible for spreading “more hatred of immigrants than any American in
history” (Anbinder, 2019).
While anti-immigration rhetoric focuses on “illegal immigration” and frames immigrants
as inherently bad, pro-immigration activists have called for reframing the debate surrounding
immigration in the U.S. In fact, they discourage the use of “illegal immigrant” altogether as they
believe it dehumanizes and marginalizes immigrants; instead, they encourage the use of
“undocumented immigrant” to refer to individuals in the U.S. without proper authorization
(Hesson, 2012; Rubio, 2011). Though the term “illegal immigrant” is used most frequently in
newspapers, several major news organizations have either reduced their use of the term or
banned it outright due to pro-immigration activists’ efforts (Guskin, 2013). As Lakoff and
Ferguson (2006) assert, framing immigration as a “civil rights problem” rather than an
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“immigration problem” would allow for a focus on humanitarian crises, displacement, and the
exploitation of undocumented immigrants who are denied basic human rights to emerge – thus,
redefining what “the problem” is to situate immigration within the historical context of injustice
(Cahill, 2009). In 2016, the Democratic Party platform followed this recommendation and
adopted new language to their official position on immigration stating the need for “humane”
immigration enforcement, with some Democrats even calling for the end of ICE (Khalid, 2019).
Additionally, Kazmi (2018) argues for reframing patriotism and national identity “in a
way that celebrates … a long history of welcoming migrants, who have helped build the country
and make it successful and prosperous.” In this sense, patriotism means taking pride in U.S.
values that support an inclusive and open nation for all, invoking a sense of community and
shared purpose by using language that emphasizes solidarity and belonging. Beyond the
implementation of the term “undocumented immigrant,” pro-immigration rhetoric also portrays
immigrants as vital assets making “massive contributions” to the U.S. and attempts to tell the
migrant story to humanize and de-emphasize the differences between immigrants and naturalborn U.S. citizens (Dalmia, 2019). Other activists and legislators attempt to reframe immigration
by reviving the “American Dream” of a land of freedom and opportunity for all, asserting that
immigrants improve U.S. communities (Tobocman & Austin, 2019), whether it is through labor
or intellectual advancements (Mehta, 2019), by emphasizing the need for a secure but fair and
compassionate system, and finally by highlighting the fact that a majority of U.S. Americans
believe immigrants strengthen the nation (Jones, 2019).
Theoretical Foundations
Populism as Political Style
With the rise in the last two decades of populist leaders around the globe, and the U.S.
American public growing more disillusioned with mainstream politics (Democracy Perception
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Index, 2018), we are living in an era of contemporary populism. Mudde (2007) defines populism
as ‘a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.’
On the other hand, Weyland (2001) states populism is ‘a political strategy through which a
personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.’ Other theorists
believe populism is a discourse that pits ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ (Hawkins, 2009), or a
political logic (Laclau 2005). However, many scholars agree that the ‘thin-ness’ of the populist
ideology allows it to be enriched with more substantive ideologies, such as nationalism or
liberalism, resulting in right or left-wing populism (Canovan, 2002, p. 32; Kriesi, 2014, p.362;
Mudde, 2004, p. 543; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Stromback, & de Vreese, 2017, p. 13; Wirth
et. al., 2016, p. 8).
While popular political theorists debate the concept of populism, Moffitt (2016) argues
for a redefinition of contemporary populism as a political style, emphasizing the performative
aspect of populism. With the rise of populism and increased mediatisation (Lilleker, 2008),
Moffitt and Tormey consider political style ‘an important conceptual tool for exploring the
contemporary political realm’ (2014, p.388). According to Moffitt, political style can be thought
of as ‘the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that
are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the
domain of government through to everyday life’ (2016, p. 28). Using this definition of political
style, he then defines populism as a political style that ‘features an appeal to “the people” versus
“the elite,” “bad manners,” and the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat’ (2016, 45). Some
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noted stylistic features of populism include dramatization, polarization, and directness among
others (e.g. Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011, p. 187). In this sense, populism is something
that you do, and is largely about how you do it.
Moffitt’s definition allows for the understanding that populism is versatile, appearing
across various contexts, ideologies (left versus right) and levels of organization (‘grass-roots’
versus tight party lines). It conceptualizes populism as gradational, similar to Oliver and Rahn’s
(2016) continuum of populism, meaning that ‘the degree of populism that a given political actor
employs may vary across contexts and over time’ (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013, p. 9). It also
emphasizes the stylistic characteristics of populism, defying the common conception that
populism is devoid of ‘substance'. Lastly, it brings the ‘inherent theatricality involved in
populism’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 5) to the forefront of the conversation.
Performing Populism
The idea that populism is theatrical lends itself to the dramaturgical perspective made
popular by Goffman (1959), which compares people interacting in everyday social life to actors
in a theatrical performance. In politics, particularly involving populism, we can therefore think of
social interactions as a series of performances. These performances of populism, according to
Moffitt (2016) include the performer, the stage, and the audience.
The performer refers to the leader of the populist movement. The leader is the one who
performs populism and is ultimately highly visible as not only the focus of their followers, but of
the opposition’s disdain as well. These performers are typically charismatic leaders who may use
vitriolic and aggressive rhetoric against others and may believe in a ‘hostile media syndrome’ in
that they are the constant target of negative news by the ‘elite media’ (Waisbord, 2013). The
leader is tasked with being of ‘the people’ and speaking with the authenticity of ‘the people’s
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voice,’ but also being above ‘the people,’ taking on a precarious balancing act of
extraordinariness and ordinariness. Moffitt (2016) argues that populists perform this
extraordinariness and ordinariness by exercising bad manners and presenting themselves as
strong and healthy. The performance of bad manners ranges from framing yourself as ‘regular
folk’, such as Sarah Palin calling herself a ‘mama grizzly’ (Miller, 2010) to political
incorrectness and coarse language, such as Jair Bolsonaro stating ‘I would prefer my son to die
in an accident than be gay’ (Hjelmgaard, 2018). Congruently, the performance of strength and
health presents itself as being the one and only voice of the people, such as Silvio Berlusconi
claiming, ‘I am the Jesus Christ of politics’ (in BBC News 2006), or denying weakness and
ailments of the body, and in being sexually assertive.
The stage refers to the media or the crisis. A ‘communicative abundance’ (Keane, 2013)
has led to the mediatisation of politics (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 114) which has allowed populists to
capitalize on this phenomenon. Media coverage of populist leaders and movements can
disseminate populist messaging to the public, but it can also publicly attack the messages or
leaders and turn the public against them. Roberts (2006, pp. 135-136) noted that mass media has
permitted populist leaders to directly reach ‘mass constituencies and demonstrate popular
support without any sort of institutional intermediation.’ New media, like social media sites,
allow populist actors to go around traditional media and address their audiences with immediacy
and directness (Bennett & Manheim, 2006; Esser, Stepinska, & Hopmann, 2017; Vaccari &
Valeriani, 2015). Politicians are able to use social media platforms such as Twitter to engage and
interact with citizens in order to make them feel involved in the political process, as well as to
blur the line between the elite and ‘the people’ (Sinha, 2017). Tweets are especially significant
for populist politicians because exposure to tweets leads to stronger feelings of connectedness
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and social presence than exposure to traditional media such as TV or newspapers (Lee, 2013;
Lee & Jang, 2013; Lee & Shin, 2014). The digitally connected now have streamlined
accessibility to politics in their pocket, given the politicians (the performer) use of Twitter and
other social networking sites (the stage) to connect with ‘the people’ (the audience). However,
traditional and new media are not the only stage for populists to perform on, as the performance
of populism sets the stage for crisis (Moffitt, 2016). Populists aren’t reacting to crises, but rather
are creating the crises with their performance.
Finally, the audience refers to ‘the people.’ Right-wing populism tends to define ‘the
people’ as the nation while excluding certain out-groups (Muller 2014), and left-wing populism
tends to refer to ‘the people’ as a class (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Meny & Surel, 2000). Canovan
(2005, p. 140) says ‘the people’ ‘cannot be restricted to a group with definite characteristics,
boundaries, structure or permanence, although it is quite capable of carrying these senses,’ which
means that anyone can ascribe to this identity. Generally speaking, ‘the people’ is meant to
express the popular will of the public and represents those who are not part of ‘the elite.’ In her
study on politicians’ use of digital platforms such as social media in political campaigns,
Baldwin-Philippi (2018) states that to understand populism in today’s world we need to examine
the technological performance of populism. She suggests that the technological performance
consists of centering ‘the people’ through four different methods: speaking to the people,
engaging with the people, styling oneself on the people, and highlighting voices of the people.
Figure 1 illustrates how common digital campaigning practices fit into this framework, but how
do these populist affordances differ during a routine political time with no campaigns? Though
Baldwin-Philippi (2018) argues that technological performances of populism are not simply
limited to the construction of populist identities online, a politician’s identity is increasingly
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important in this thriving age of identity-based hyper-partisanship (Taylor, 2016) and identity
politics.
Figure 1. Populist affordances model and digital campaign practices. Baldwin-Philippi, New
Media & Society (Volume 21, Issue 2) pp. 376-397, copyright © 2018 by (Baldwin-Philippi)
Reprinted by Permission of SAGE Publications, Ltd.

Populism and Identity Politics
Politicians across the ideological spectrum are engaging in ‘mass self-communication’
(Castells, 2009), using various platforms to engage in identity performance, or the presentation
of self (Goffman, 1959), for their audiences. Social media users are able to curate these identities
through status updates, photos, and videos, among others (Mendelson and Papacharissi, 2010).
This new era of personalization in social media and politics has fostered the re-emergence of
identity politics and has empowered various communities to amplify their voice and exercise
political power. Given this personalization and rise of division in the U.S. (Pew Research Center,
2014) and identity politics around the globe (Hardy, 2016), it is important to understand how
various forms of identity politics are an integral element of modern populism - regardless of
where an individual or politician may be situated on the ideological spectrum. In fact, Muller
(2016) believes that ‘populism is always a form of identity politics’ (p. 3).
Historically, identity politics emerged as a term for those of marginalized groups united
by certain identities advancing their common interests through political action (Mohanty, 2011).
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One may personally identify themselves according to a number of classifications - gender,
sexuality, race, ethnicity, and social class, to name a few; thus, identity politics refers to the
tendency of those of certain social groups or identities to vote and act politically in a way that
benefits their social or demographic groups, and includes the ways in which one’s identity
shapes their politics. As Hobsbawm (1996) notes, ethnicity has been central to U.S. identity
politics throughout the years, particularly as immigration continues to grow as a major and
divisive issue in U.S. politics. Today, identity politics carries a negative connotation and is often
used as a derogatory term for feminism, anti-racism and anti-heterosexism (Fraser, 1998), or on
the contrary as a term for white-nationalism or white supremacy (Greenhut, 2019; Malik, 2019;
Thomas, 2019).
Trump’s presidency has been linked to white identity politics since the inception of his
2016 campaign, and Pettigrew (2017) argues that support for Trump’s populism is directly linked
to perceptions of in-group disadvantages. Perceptions of this kind of deprivation for one’s group
breed feelings of injustice and resentment toward out-groups (Cramer, 2016; Doosje, Loseman &
van den Bos, 2013; Mols & Jetten, 2016), and in Trump’s case this includes immigrants who are
perceived as a ‘threat’ to the alleged disadvantaged group. As Marchlewska, Cichocka,
Panayiotou, Castellanos & Batayneh (2017) found, perceptions of in-group disadvantage are
positively related to populist views, and populist movements are often seen as a result of
deprived in-groups ‘taking back control’ (Farage, 2016). While this does not necessarily mean
that all populist movements derive from alleged in-group deprivations and could very well come
from marginalized out-groups becoming empowered, it may reinforce ideas of prejudice or
feelings of injustice.
Right- Versus Left-wing Populism
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At the heart of populism is the divide between the ‘good’ (us) and the ‘evil’ (them).
Depending on which end of the political spectrum they fall on, this can have vastly different
meanings to populists and their audience - ‘the people.’ Right-wing populism tends to engage in
and promote exclusionary rhetoric and viewpoints, or excluding populism (Jagers & Walgrave,
2007), denying outgroups the opportunity to be part of ‘the people.’ The ‘good’ native people are
morally opposed to ‘evil’ refugee or immigrant out-groups, which pose a threat to them (Taggart,
2000). For instance, Mazzoleni (2018) found that refugees are seen as the cause of economic and
cultural problems for the native people. Indeed, in Western Europe increasing numbers of
immigrants significantly contributed to the success of populist parties (Knigge, 1998).
This exclusionary right-wing populism is an old and global phenomenon. Right-wing
populist communication is often characterized as anti-immigrant, anti-establishment and anticultural elites. These xenophobic and exclusionary ideas, usually directed against ethnic or
religious ‘others’ are the bedrock for right-wing populism (Betz, 2001), and oftentimes the
exclusionary rhetoric of right-wing populist politicians takes the form of racist statements and
slogans. While populist communication can be identified by elements of emotionalization (Betz,
1993; Canovan, 1999; Mazzoleni et al. 2003), dramatization (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008;
Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000), absolutism (Bos & Brants, 2014; Engesser et al., 2017; Hawkins,
2009), or colloquialism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Stewart et al., 2003; Taggart, 2000), it
becomes right-wing populism when paired with anti-immigrant rhetoric that seeks to
delegitimize and demonize the ‘others.’ Though right-wing populism is exclusionary, and at
times racist, it can easily become socially acceptable due to reframing of the rhetoric as patriotic
or preserving ‘our’ culture.
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Whereas right-wing populism is highly exclusionary toward immigrants and foreigners,
and views ‘the people’ in nativist and ethnic terms, left-wing populism views ‘the people’ as a
social class or those of marginalized groups, and thus tends to be free of xenophobic and antiimmigration views. Instead, it is distinctly inclusionary of these perceived out-groups and
promotes equality for women, immigrants, and members of the LGBTQ community (Stavrakakis
& Katsambekis, 2014). Left-wing populism is similar to its right-wing counterpart in that it is
anti-establishment and anti-elite; however, they key difference is that it is not exclusionary of
out-groups. There is still much to learn about how left-wing populism is communicated and
performed.
Emotion also plays a crucial role in populism. Salmela and von Scheve (2018) explain
that “feelings of fear associated with insecurity, powerlessness, and declassement, on the one
hand, and anger, resentment, indignation, and hate, on the other hand” (p. 439) drive the rise and
success of populist parties, whether left or right. With right-wing populism, fear and insecurity coupled with repressed individual shame toward social identities - transform into anger,
resentment and hatred toward out-groups (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018). Thus, right-wing
populist rhetoric promotes this anger and resentment towards establishment politicians, refugees,
welfare recipients, and other groups perceived as ethnically, culturally, politically or sexually
different. While left-wing populism is still associated with fear, anger and resentment, these
feelings may instead emerge from “the acknowledgement and social sharing of negative selffocused emotions [shame and humiliation], which allows and supports their transformation into
anger and indignation at particular others but also into pride, joy, and hope similarly as in various
civil rights movements” (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p. 449). In this sense, left-wing populists
foster the sharing of emotions and ideas to create a collective identity as aggrieved citizens,
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empowered by solidarity and collective political agency. In contrast to right-wing populist
communication, left-wing rhetoric promotes anger and resentment towards those in power who
are responsible for enforcing the status quo and perceived injustice and inequality.
Right-wing Populist Donald Trump.
Former businessman and reality TV personality Donald Trump stunned pollsters
nationwide with an upset for the U.S. presidency in the 2016 election against Democratic
nominee Hillary Clinton. His reputation as an acclaimed billionaire and charismatic celebrity,
coupled with his intensely active use of Twitter - where he has over 65 million followers - and
controversial rhetoric and style of governing has put his presidency in an extraordinary spotlight.
Trump has been called “the perfect populist” (Lind, 2016), a white nationalist (Goldberg, 2019),
and a white supremacist (Thomas & Cruz, 2019). All of these reasons and more make Trump’s
performance of populism the epitome of a case study concerning exclusionary rhetoric.
Left-wing Populist Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
Bartender turned U.S. House Representative, Ocasio-Cortez rose to stardom when she
beat the incumbent for New York’s 14th Congressional District and at 28 years old became the
youngest female Congresswoman in United States history. With multiple appearances on late
night TV shows and an engaging presence on social media with over three million followers on
her personal Twitter account, Ocasio-Cortez is a celebrity in her own right. She has been called
the future of the Democratic party, even while some have drawn comparisons to Ocasio-Cortez
and President Donald Trump’s political style (Baker, 2018; Last, 2019; Tauberg, 2018). Though
they vary greatly in ideology, with Ocasio-Cortez being a democratic socialist and Trump a
conservative republican, both politicians used similar populist tactics to get elected and maintain
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popularity with their respective bases. This makes both Trump and Ocasio-Cortez ideal case
studies for the performance of populism, as well as exclusionary and inclusionary rhetoric.
Research Questions
RQ1: How does Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez perform populism on Twitter as she engages
with the issue of immigration?
RQ2: To what extent does Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's performance of populism rely on
Baldwin-Philippi's four ways of "centering the people"?
RQ3: How does Donald Trump perform populism on Twitter as he engages with the issue
of immigration?
RQ4: To what extent does Donald Trump's performance of populism rely on BaldwinPhilippi's four ways of "centering the people"?
RQ5: What are the similarities and differences in Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's and Donald
Trump's performances of populism on Twitter in relation to immigration?
RQ6: What role does exclusionary and inclusionary rhetoric play in these performances
of populism?
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This study examines Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s performance of right- and left-wing
populism in relation to immigration, specifically exploring the role of exclusionary and
inclusionary rhetoric on Twitter during the height of the humanitarian crisis at the southern
border. I chose to examine Twitter due to its salience in both Ocasio-Cortez’s and Trump’s
strategy of political communication, and the medium’s populist nature (Bimber, 1998; Engesser
et al., 2017), as social media can be used as a stage for populist actors to achieve a direct and
immediate connection to their audience (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). For Trump and OcasioCortez, Twitter provides easy access to disseminate their messaging to the platform’s 59.35
million active users in the U.S. (Clement, 2020), and their own respective 73.2 million and 6.4
million followers. In general, Ocasio-Cortez averages about 80 tweets per week, while Trump
tweets so often – about 200 times per week – that many have dubbed him the “Tweeter in Chief”
(Johnson, 2020, O’Donnell & Stelloh, 2017). In a deep dive on Trump’s Twitter habits, the New
York Times (2019) found that over the course of his presidency, Trump has tweeted over 11,000
times and has attacked immigrants 570 times through Twitter. Ocasio-Cortez tweeted 1,086
times during the crisis, with more than a quarter of her tweets directly relating to immigration,
while Trump tweeted 2,502 times with only 7% relating to immigration.
A comparative content analysis was conducted of all Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s tweets
posted from May through August 2019. This timeline was chosen because I wanted to explore
how Ocasio-Cortez and Trump performed populism specifically during a time of extreme tension
relating to immigration, as this was when reports of migrant deaths and family separations
dominated both the media and the political conversation in the U.S. To collect the data for this
study, I needed to use two different methods to compile the necessary tweets. For Ocasio-Cortez,
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I used software Followers Analysis to download her most recent 3,200 tweets, as well as a
comprehensive analysis of her Twitter use. From there, I reduced the data by removing all tweets
from outside the crisis time period and searching for immigration-specific keywords (see
Appendix C), eliminating any tweets that did not fit these criteria. Gathering Trump’s tweets was
slightly more complex. I utilized the Trump Twitter Archive, a website that logs nearly all
Trump’s tweets, to search for the same keywords during the same time period. I then exported
those results for my full list of Trump’s tweets relating to immigration. In total, I analyzed 461
tweets – 284 from Ocasio-Cortez and 177 from Trump. In addition to the text of the tweets, I
also examined accompanying visuals to the tweets, such as photos and videos, to get a holistic
view of their online performance. Even though the use of photos and videos was more prevalent
in Ocasio-Cortez’s tweets than it was Trump’s, I chose to include the supplementary visual
messaging tactics as part of my analysis because of their potential to strategically portray both
positive media coverage for their policies and positions, as well as their ability to spread their
immigration messaging and communicate to their audiences. When visuals are applicable, it is
important to combine the text of the tweet with the photo or video for a comprehensive
understanding of Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s online performance of populism.
After collecting and managing the data, a grounded theory approach was utilized (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967) to analyze Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s tweets using open coding to identify
emerging themes. First, I oriented myself using the relevant literature on immigration rhetoric
and Baldwin-Philippi’s (2018) four categories of ‘centering the people.’ Then I separately
examined Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s tweets, looking for as many categories as possible
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), which led me to 45 individual categories – 23 for Trump and 22 for
Ocasio-Cortez. After reaching this level of categories, I developed a codebook for both sets of
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data, listing all categories and recording how many times they occurred naturally in the data.
From there, I began integrating the categories through axial coding, or making connections
between separate categories to create a new theme that spans many categories. For example,
previously identified categories such as “pro-immigration is bad for the U.S.,” “immigrants as a
crisis for the U.S.,” and “protecting the U.S.” forged together to become one new theme –
“Putting ‘America First.’” This process took me from 45 original categories down to four
overarching themes. Once these final themes were identified, I began to explore how they
connected with Baldwin-Philippi’s four ways of ‘centering the people’ – speaking to, engaging
with, styling self on, and highlighting the voices of ‘the people’ – and Moffitt’s theory of the
performance of populism, in this case using social media as the stage to reach the audience.
Ultimately, these themes reflect how, and to what extent, Ocasio-Cortez and Trump differ in
their performance of populism in relation to immigration on Twitter, and what role exclusionary
and inclusionary rhetoric play in this performance.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s Performance of Populism on Twitter
As indicated by both Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s patterns of tweeting during the peak of
the immigration crisis in the summer of 2019, their Twitter accounts served as a direct stage to
communicate their individual exclusionary and inclusionary rhetoric and perform populism for
their audiences. Ocasio-Cortez consistently posted daily, tweeting about immigration and the
border crisis 284 times. Trump also tweeted multiple times daily. However, he tweeted only 177
times about immigration issues – significantly less than Ocasio-Cortez. Throughout the 461
tweets examined in this case study, four major themes were identified: condemning the
degradation of the U.S., acting as an immigration warrior, developing an “America for All,” and
putting “America First.” See Table 1 for a breakdown of how often each theme occurred during
the study period.
Condemning the Degradation of the U.S.
The most frequent theme discovered in this case study was the condemnation of the
perceived state of decline in the U.S. in relation to the issue of immigration. While OcasioCortez and Trump both assert this sentiment, their motives in doing so are entirely oppositional.
For Ocasio-Cortez, the presence of racism, white supremacy, and corruption within politics, as
well as the direct manifestation of these issues with the inhumane treatment of immigrants at the
border and across the country, are all negative factors accelerating the breakdown of the U.S. and
its base values. Putting it bluntly, she said, “We’re melting away our Constitutional rights – all
for the excuse of hating immigrants. We’re shredding what it means to be American.” This is
perhaps best visually embodied in Ocasio-Cortez’s tweet of photos from her emotional visit to a

30

Table 1
Ocasio-Cortez and Trump's Total Tweets and Theme Occurrences
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez

Donald Trump

1,086

2,052

284

177

Condemning the degradation of
the U.S.

461

263

Acting as an immigration warrior

247

91

--

215

130

--

Total tweets during study period
Total tweets on immigration
Number of times each theme occurred:

Putting “America First”
Developing an “America for All”

detention center on the border, showing her engagement with ‘the people,’ saying “I’ll never
forget this, because it was the moment I saw with my own eyes that the America I love was
becoming a nation that steals refugee children from their parents & caged them” (see Figure 2).
Ocasio-Cortez explicitly blames Trump’s rhetoric and policies, that she says are not about
immigration but rather ethnicity and racism, for this degradation. When Trump claimed not to
have a racist bone in his body, Ocasio-Cortez retorted that he had both a racist mind and heart,
which causes him to “violate the rights of children” and order those perceived as ‘other’ to go
back to where they came from (see Figure 3). In another instance, she calls out the danger in
Trump’s use of words like “invasion” and “infestation” when talking about Latinx people, “this
is the language of white supremacy & it goes all the way to the top. It’s not a matter of political
stances. This is stoking hatred + endangering the country.” In fact, Ocasio-Cortez tweeted about
or to Trump 47 times throughout the course of this study period.
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Figure 2. Ocasio-Cortez Condemning the Decline of the U.S.

Figure 3. Ocasio-Cortez Calling Trump Racist in Mind and Heart
Ocasio-Cortez would also often retweet verified accounts to call out Trump’s racism
while simultaneously emphasizing her identity as a daughter of immigrants, as evidenced by her
retweet of fellow U.S. Rep. Brendan Boyle’s tweet noting the double-standard of Trump telling
women of color in Congress to go back to where they came from (see Figure 4). In other
instances, Ocasio-Cortez used retweets to highlight the voices of ‘the people’ and show support
for her own positions, such as when she highlighted the voice of fellow “Squad” member Rep.
Ayanna Pressley’s tweet saying “These families need trauma support, case workers, clean water,
adequate and nutritious food. Instead they have received a level of degradation we should be
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ashamed is occurring on American soil.” Ocasio-Cortez uses retweets such as these to both
expose racism in the U.S.’s institutions and leaders, as well as to attempt to humanize and unother immigrants by demonstrating the treatment they experience at the southern border.

Figure 4. U.S. Representative Brendan Boyle Implying Double Standard of Racism.
Ocasio-Cortez consistently expresses anger about the current state of the U.S. regarding
immigration and politics in this way, particularly taking aim at the Republican party and their
leadership. For example, in reference to a Mother Jones article on the issues at the border and the
battle between Ocasio-Cortez and the Republicans, she called the right “bullies” who
demonstrate “heartless cruelty towards other human beings escaping violence & despair” and an
“indifference to everyday Americans.” Ocasio-Cortez’s rhetoric of blaming the right for the
debasement of the U.S. and the country’s core values as a nation for all reaffirms our current
understanding of left-wing populism that promotes anger and resentment toward those in power
enforcing unjust policies. It also perpetuates the us vs. them dichotomy by pitting “everyday
Americans” against the “evil” right. In this case, the fear and insecurity over the loss of
“American” values transform into resentment and hatred not toward out-groups but toward the
Republicans as an in-group. Further, Ocasio-Cortez styles herself as truly American and of ‘the
people’ by openly claiming to have “chosen the side of the people” by fighting for the freedom
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of all people (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Ocasio-Cortez Claiming to be on the Side of the People.
Ocasio-Cortez also often portrays righteousness in relation to immigration, exhibiting a
sense of having the moral high ground in relation to the human rights violations occurring
throughout the U.S. and at the border. This is evident through her many tweets drawing attention
to the “horrifying” conditions immigrants experience at the border brought on by a “systemic
cruelty [with] a dehumanizing culture that treats them like animals,” and allegations that
detainees are deprived of “humane sleep conditions,” experience “severe overcrowding,” and
that the administration are “caging children & families in conditions that have killed almost 30
people.” Perhaps most importantly, Ocasio-Cortez used photograph evidence and news articles
to back up her claims of the inhumane conditions at the southern border, such as when she
retweeted one journalist who said, “So what @AOC told us was true,” in reference to these
conditions. In this sense, Ocasio-Cortez is bolstering tweets such as this to boost her own
credibility and to tell ‘the people’ that she can be trusted to tell the truth. This tactic proved
useful for Ocasio-Cortez when she controversially dubbed the detainment centers at the border
concentration camps – using the term 38 times throughout the study period. When receiving
criticism for her use of the word, Ocasio-Cortez countered with expert analysis (see Figure 6),
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speaking to ‘the people’ by highlighting data from perceived credible sources and expert
opinions to emphasize her points. This is a form of speaking to the people in the sense that she
perceives her audience to be driven by facts and science, rather than ‘alternative facts.’ It is
important to note that Trump also engaged in communication of this nature, but while OcasioCortez used data and articles to expose inhumane conditions and human rights violations in the
hopes of protecting immigrants, Trump focused on crimes committed by immigrants to unite his
base against a villainous ‘other.’

Figure 6. Ocasio-Cortez Citing Expert on Concentration Camps
While Ocasio-Cortez deems the degradation of the U.S. to be the fault of the right and
racist rhetoric and policies, Trump believes it to be the result of incompetent U.S. institutions and
policies enacted by Democrats, resulting in an immigration crisis. Trump uses the term “border
crisis” or “national security crisis” 30 times throughout the study period, perpetuating the notion
that immigrants coming to the U.S. is a problem for the country. He demonstrates this crisis by
claiming immigrants are attempting to flood the country and that there is no room for them in the
U.S., such as when he said, “Courts & Dems in Congress, neither of which have a clue, are
trying to FORCE migrants into our Country! OUR COUNTRY IS FULL, OUR DETENTION
CENTERS, HOSPITALS & SCHOOLS ARE PACKED. Crazy!” Trump would also often
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highlight the voices of other politicians representing his audience to reiterate “the worsening
border crisis” and express the need for closed borders. Though Ocasio-Cortez also uses the term
crisis, she refers to the humanitarian crisis at the border with the inhumane treatment and human
rights violations immigrants experience at the hands of U.S. Americans; but in Trump’s case, the
idea of the border crisis strictly refers to the number of immigrants attempting to come to the
U.S., and the impact they will have on the country’s resources. Thus, both Trump and OcasioCortez’s performances of populism support Moffitt’s (2016) theory that populists use new media
both as a stage to reach their audience but also to set the stage for and create crises.
Like Ocasio-Cortez, Trump also perpetuated the us vs. them narrative central to populism
by explicitly blaming the “radical” Democrats for today’s immigration crisis – 67 times, in fact.
This fits the traditional form of populism in that the fear and insecurity associated with the
changes “open borders” and immigrants would bring to the country transform into resentment
and hatred toward immigrants and those perceived as fighting for the out-group and not U.S.
citizens. Trump’s tweets maintain his belief that the border crisis was caused by the broken and
incompetent immigration policies created by the Democratic party, rather than his own
administration’s policies, and would transfer the blame entirely away from him and toward the
Democrats. He calls U.S. immigration laws “totally flawed & broken,” referencing border
loopholes, “old and worthless barriers,” and court rulings “against Border Security and in favor
of crime, drugs and human trafficking.” Further, Trump continuously blamed Democrats for the
“dysfunctional immigration process,” positioning them as the reason the U.S. is being “taken
advantage of” by Mexico (see Figure 7) and the cause of the “mess” at the southern border by
“refusing to work.” Additionally, just as Ocasio-Cortez focuses on Trump as the leader behind
the crisis, Trump in turn concentrates on her role as a leader for the left in the immigration
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debate, claiming that she and other “very unpopular & unrepresentative Congresswomen” spew
“foul language & racist hatred,” and further asserting “they hate our own country” and “AOC
Plus 3 are a Nightmare for America!” Trump specifically called out Ocasio-Cortez and the other
members of the “Squad,” which consists of Reps. Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida
Tlaib – all women of color, claiming they are the racist “troublemakers” debasing the country
(see Figure 8).

Figure 7. Trump Blaming Democrats for U.S. Immigration Problems.
Again, like Ocasio-Cortez, Trump frequently expressed anger throughout his tweets, but
unlike Ocasio-Cortez he would aim this anger at the mainstream media as it pertained to
immigration, and his lack of credit for building a border wall. Trump would call out “false
reporting” on the border, using his catch phrase “Fake News,” demeaning and mocking the news
organizations and journalists in the process. For instance, he called CNN “so dishonest” and

Figure 8. Trump Denouncing the “Squad.”
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claimed, “The Fake News Media, in particular the Failing @nytimes, is writing phony and
exaggerated accounts of the Border Detention Centers.” Trump also singled out CNN’s Don
Lemon, calling him the “dumbest man on television,” adding that he is “too dumb” to realize “he
is supposed to be neutral, unbiased & fair.” He would also use retweets here to emphasize his
own dissatisfaction with the mainstream media, best exemplified by his sharing of a right-wing
news article on corporate media failure (see Figure 9). Trump’s performance of disdain and
anger for the media here aligns with what we know of populists in that he perpetuates his own
belief of and existence in a “hostile media syndrome,” and circumvents the need to interact with
the traditional media by taking to social media to get his messaging out to ‘the people.’

Figure 9. The Federalist Article on Corporate Media Failure.
Acting as an Immigration Warrior
Another recurring theme to emerge throughout Ocasio-Cortez and Trump’s tweets was
that of the “immigration warrior.” Both populist politicians behaved as public leaders for their
respective ideologies on the issue of immigration, obtaining widespread high visibility while
performing to their collective millions of followers. In Trump’s case, acting as an immigration
warrior manifested as presenting himself as the one true savior of a broken system and praising
38

his administration’s border policies as good for the overall wellbeing of the country and
beneficial to its citizens. Trump continuously references a desperate need to fix the U.S.’s
“broken” system with immigration reform, framing himself as the only one capable of doing so
under his administration’s policies and through the construction of a southern border wall.
Trump would style himself as one of ‘the people’ of a country in need of safeguarding, meaning
that he invoked the values of his conservative base by portraying immigrants as detrimental to
the country and praising his policies because that is what ‘the people’ want and need, according
to him. Trump would often tweet his solutions for the immigration crisis, ranging from imposing
tariffs on Mexico to stating that Democrats could “fix everything so easily” by simply voting for
his party’s proposed policies. In one tweet, Trump goes so far as to say that his “plan to create a
fair, modern & LAWFUL system of immigration for the U.S” would be “the pride of our Nation
and the envy of the modern world.”
When Trump and his administration came under fire for the humanitarian crisis of family
separation at the border, he would often blame former President Barack Obama for that policy
while stating that he was actually the one to end the problem (see Figure 10). By doing so,
Trump depicts himself as superior. This framing of Trump and his policies as heroic for
immigration could be seen throughout his own tweets, but also in those he retweeted as well,
such as when he shared Sen. Jim Inhofe’s tweet stating, “Due to joint cooperation border
crossings have [dropped] 43% over the past 2 months & we’re looking forward to seeing that
continue thanks to @realdonaldtrump & our Mexican partners.” Trump used retweets such as
this one to demonstrate his success on immigration and portray himself as the solution to the
crisis at hand. In breaking with Baldwin-Philippi’s (2018) original findings, Trump did not
highlight traditional voices of ‘the people’ in the sense that he retweeted unverified regular users.
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Instead he retweeted verified users – typically journalists and other politicians, approximately
25% of the time. Similar to the use of retweets, Trump’s own tweets often pushed the narrative
of his successes with immigration, and in one perhaps tone-deaf instance given the nature of the
immigration crisis, he declared “Great things are happening at the border!” in response to
another Senator’s video showing a tour of the border wall under construction.

Figure 10. Trump Blaming Obama for Family Separation

Contrary to Trump, Ocasio-Cortez portrayed herself as an immigration warrior for
immigrants themselves, but for the U.S.’s values and status as a nation of immigrants too. She
does this by denouncing the border patrol and government officials enforcing “un-American”
policies, deliberately calling attention to grievances immigrants experience at the hands of the
U.S. government, and advocating for the protection of all regardless of race or nationality. To do
so, Ocasio-Cortez styled herself on ‘the people’ under the values of her progressive audience,
advocating for the humane treatment of immigrants and highlighting the benefits they bring to
the U.S.’s economy and cultural fabric. Ocasio-Cortez frames immigrants as “inherently
valuable” human beings doing the best they can for their families to escape dangerous situations
and go after the American dream, often referencing to immigrants as “our neighbors” that need
to be protected. Ocasio-Cortez rebuked the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies numerous times, calling them
dangerous to the country, noting that even U.S. citizens are suffering at their hands, and using
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#AbolishICE to advocate for the dismantling of the organization. Similar to Trump’s use of
retweets, Ocasio-Cortez would highlight the voices of ‘the people’ by retweeting Latin American
news organizations or other politicians to empower immigrants with the knowledge of their
rights, such as when she shared Univision Nueva York’s warning in Spanish that ICE was
preparing to deport thousands of undocumented immigrants accompanied with a guide on what
to do if you are stopped by authorities (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. Univision Nueva York Warning of ICE Raid
At other times, she would highlight the voices of ‘the people’ by sharing immigrant
stories to demonstrate the destruction to the health and wellbeing of those affected by these
organizations, giving a voice to the voiceless. For example, she retweeted a video showing an
interaction she had with an immigrant woman captioned, “Yazmin Juárez, whose 19-month-old
daughter died weeks after being released from ICE detainment in 2018, testified before Congress
today, describing the mistreatment she faced while seeking asylum. Her testimony, at times,
brought @AOC to tears.” Not only does this tweet amplify the voice of a grieving immigrant
mother, but it acts doubly as an indicator that Ocasio-Cortez is human and affected by the pain
and suffering of ‘the people.’ Ocasio-Cortez used visuals like these to further deepen these
stories and to show engagement with ‘the people.’ As Baldwin-Philippi (2018) notes, engaging
with ‘the people’ mainly consists of replying with constituents online to have direct one-on-one
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conversations. Neither Trump nor Ocasio-Cortez opt to engage with ‘the people’ in this way in
relation to immigration. Instead, Ocasio-Cortez conveys engagement with constituents and
immigrants alike through photos and videos. In switching our thinking of ‘the people’ to include
immigrants and refugees, Ocasio-Cortez consistently emphasizes how she listens to and fosters a
connection with immigrants by posting photos of that engagement. In one instance she shared a
photo (see Figure 12) taken from her visit to one of the “concentration camps,” as she calls it.
Ocasio-Cortez also shared her personal accounts of these interactions, saying “I believe these
women. I believe the canker sores that I saw in their mouths. I believed when they said they were
sleeping on concrete floors,” all while decrying these women were suffering under the guise of
protecting the country.

Figure 12. Ocasio-Cortez Showcasing Engagement with Immigrants
Ocasio-Cortez also engaged in targeted communication by speaking to ‘the people’ to
communicate with immigrants the message that the U.S. welcomes everyone, like when she said,
“Quiero decirle a los niños que no importa lo que diga el presidente, este país les pertenece," (“I
want to tell the children that no matter what the president says, this country belongs to them”).
English was the main language that Ocasio-Cortez would use to communicate on Twitter, but her
use of Spanish in relation to immigration issues was significant because it allows her to connect
with a new kind of ‘the people’ – one that includes both U.S. American-born citizens and
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immigrants or refugees, as well as to communicate with a marginalized community that doesn’t
always feel represented and involved in politics. This is especially important for Ocasio-Cortez
because ultimately, she believes the U.S. is a nation of immigrants. She goes so far as to say that
it is un-American to turn away immigrants (see Figure 13). Also involved in Ocasio-Cortez’s
method of centering ‘the people’ by acting as an immigration warrior is styling oneself on ‘the
people’ by displaying of emotion and compassion for immigrants. By showing an emotional
response to the situations of immigrants at the border, Ocasio-Cortez is styling herself as more
than just a politician, but a fellow human being that is affected by another’s suffering. OcasioCortez’s base consider the situation at the border major human rights violations, so this display
of emotion furthers her status as a protector of the voiceless and less fortunate.

Figure 13. Ocasio-Cortez Calling GOP Un-American

Putting “America First”
Trump and Ocasio-Cortez exhibited similar performances of populism with variations
regarding their position on immigration. However, the main difference existed in the rhetoric
used by the left and right-wing politicians. Trump consistently expressed typical right-wing antiimmigration exclusive populist messaging resulting in the main theme of “Putting America
First.” This is primarily characterized by Trump’s desire to act on the will of ‘the people’ by
“taking care of American citizens first” and protect the U.S. from criminal immigrants, as being
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pro-immigrant is anti-U.S. in his eyes. Trump portrays himself as acting for the good of the U.S.
by styling himself as one of ‘the people’ of a country in need of safeguarding and reiterating the
danger in having open borders, meaning that he invoked the values of his conservative base. This
was displayed by his rhetoric portraying immigrants and refugees as a crisis for the U.S., as well
as framing them as dangerous criminals, animals, and bad parents, all in the name of protecting
U.S. Americans – because that is what ‘the people’ want and need, according to Trump. In one
instance he said, “Republicans want what’s good for America – the exact opposite [of what
Democrats want],” and in another he claims that “America has had enough!” Painting all
immigrants as criminals and dangerous people that should not be allowed into the U.S. was a
reoccurring theme throughout Trump’s tweets during this time (see Figure 14). In fact, out of his
177 immigration-related tweets, Trump made references to immigrants as dangerous criminals
49 times and the acceptance of immigrants as bad for the U.S. 46 times during this time period.
He also continuously asserted the border wall’s necessity for the protection from criminal
immigrants and praised the “Big WIN for Border Security and the Rule of Law!” when the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned a ruling, allowing for construction to proceed.

Figure 14. Trump Implying Immigrants Bring Drugs to the U.S.
Trump frequently praised the work of border patrol agents in apprehending immigrants,
further emphasizing their positions as criminals, such as when he shared an official White House
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tweet stating, “agents arrested a previously deported child rapist on Wednesday after he
attempted to re-enter the United States illegally. He’d been deported twice before. THANK YOU
to our amazing Border Patrol agents for making our country safer!” Additionally, Trump would
retweet users to display support in “Putting America First,” and to tell ‘the people’ he agrees
with something – showcasing his own support for opinions and statements from others. For
instance, he retweeted Judicial Watch’s petition demanding a “secure border wall.” However,
most of Trump’s retweets were used to perpetuate the notion that immigrants are criminals that
are putting U.S. Americans at risk, such as when he retweeted one reporter’s tweet stating a
school shooter’s father was a “criminal illegal alien from Mexico” (see Figure 15). Just as
Ocasio-Cortez used her tweets to improve her credibility and trustworthiness, Trump used the
same tactics. The difference between the two is that Trump utilized this tactic to push the
narrative that immigrants are detrimental to the state of the U.S. and its citizens, often stating
facts without sources, while Ocasio-Cortez would directly link to experts or data sources to back
up her claims.

Figure 15. Reporter Sharing News of Immigrant Father of School Shooter.
Trump’s tweets were of the mindset that what was good for immigrants was bad for the
U.S., and often claimed that Democrats cared more about immigrants and their welfare than for
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U.S. citizens. He implied this notion again and again, such as when he suggested the Democrats
would destroy the U.S. middle class by way of open borders, or when he simply said it’s “time to
put Americans first” in relation to the Democrats’ failure to fix the immigration crisis in the past
ten years. Trump would also share tweets from the official White House account to demonstrate
the successes for U.S. Americans with the deportation of immigrants, such as when the account
claimed “Americans are applying for the open jobs” after an ICE raid on a food plan in
Mississippi. In addition, he styled himself as morally aligned with ‘the people,’ displaying
outrage at Ocasio-Cortez’s use of the term “concentration camps” for the border detention
centers, and when he retweeted U.S. Representative Doug Collins who blamed Democrats for
misrepresenting conditions at the border as child abuse and torture (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. U.S. Representative Doug Collins Blaming Democrats for Border Conditions.

Developing an “America for All”
Contrary to the exclusionary rhetoric used in Trump’s performance of populism, OcasioCortez expressed highly inclusive messaging in her immigration rhetoric used throughout her
own performance of populism. Ocasio-Cortez portrayed an image of an inclusive U.S. with
messages of unity, love and hope, and thus, providing the space for this traditional out-group to
become part of ‘the people.’ Like Trump, Ocasio-Cortez invokes her own progressive base,
styling herself as one of ‘the people’ of an America built by immigrants that remains open to all.
She calls for a reset to the way we think and talk about immigrants in the U.S., saying it’s a “lie
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that immigrants are ‘takers,’ or represent a weight on society. It’s wrong. Immigrants are
*makers.* They create+offer opportunity. They aren’t a weight to carry; in fact, they are our
nation’s shoulders.” She claims that “immigration policy isn’t about ‘containing a problem,’”
and speaks of the opportunity and inherent value immigrants bring with them to the U.S.,
particularly as undocumented taxpayers. Another way Ocasio-Cortez portrays immigrants as
valuable members of U.S. society is by retweeting a video that asks, “What defines an
American?” by interviewing deported veterans who served in the U.S. military, but are not
citizens. Ocasio-Cortez even used references to the Bible and Christianity to not only humanize
immigrants that are typically thought of as ‘other,’ but also to style herself as one of ‘the people,’
since the majority of U.S. Americans identify as Christian. For example, she retweeted an article
from The Atlantic with the caption, "We know exactly where Christ is, because he told us. He’s
with the sick and the jailed and the hungry. He’s in those camps with those suffering children.
And we need to be there, too." In another instance she quoted the Bible, saying, “Truly, I say to
you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me,” to draw the
comparison between Christianity and Democratic Socialism’s views on what a fair and just
society looks like.
Ocasio-Cortez’s rhetoric encourages the inclusion of immigrants into the U.S., but also
promotes the unity of everyday U.S. Americans. This presents itself by inspiring the coming
together of “neighbors,” but also by highlighting acts of solidarity. In response to ICE raids,
Ocasio-Cortez advocated that “NOW is the time for us to come together,” and to open up your
homes to “be a safe space or haven for others” to “plan, prepare, + protect our neighbors.” By
using the term “neighbor” when referencing undocumented immigrants, Ocasio-Cortez
intentionally frames them as functioning members of society, and part of the in-group (i.e. – the
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“us” in “us vs. them”). However, the notion of coming together is not limited to just immigrants
and everyday citizens in Ocasio-Cortez eyes. She also uses this narrative to speak to the ‘other,’
in this case those “infected with white supremacy,” telling them that now is the time to come
back to the side of love (see Figure 17). Ocasio-Cortez implies the “corrupt elites” have infected
“the other people” with white supremacy, and expresses hope and redemption for the ‘other,’
offering them a place in the ‘good people.’

Figure 17. Ocasio-Cortez Offering Redemption to White Supremacists.
Beyond these instances of coming together, Ocasio-Cortez also highlights acts of
solidarity by other U.S. citizens to advocate for immigrant rights as human beings and part of
‘the people.’ For example, she shared several #JewsAgainstICE posts regarding their
#NeverAgain protests, such as when she said, “Also deserving of our attention and support: 36
young Jewish activists were arrested today for nonviolent direct action against migrant
conditions in Elizabeth, NJ.” She even promoted the financial support for the protestors with a
direct link to a GoFundMe page set up to aid in their legal funds, and thanked them for their
“courage, compassion, and selflessness in pursuit of justice.” In another instance, Ocasio-Cortez
calls attention to the Wayfair protest when “workers couldn’t stomach they were making beds to
cage children.” She said, “This is what solidarity looks like - a reminder that everyday people
have real power, as long as we’re brave enough to use it.” By saying “we” in references to acts
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of solidarity and holding the power, Ocasio-Cortez directly includes herself as one of ‘the
people,’ styling herself as one of everyday citizens taking back the power. Additionally, OcasioCortez engages with ‘the people’ in this way by sharing their stories and thanking them for their
service to the U.S. and for their neighbors in these acts of solidarity and advocacy for immigrants
in detention centers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Summary of Research Findings
The concept of populism as a performance on a political gradation is a relatively new
idea, and gaps remain in how left-wing politicians differ from right-wing politicians in their
ability to perform populism to engage with ‘the people.’ This thesis seeks to address that gap by
examining a specific case study using Donald Trump and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Twitter
account during the peak of the 2019 immigration crisis through the lens of Baldwin-Philippi’s
(2018) four methods of centering ‘the people’: speaking to the people, engaging with the people,
styling oneself on the people, and highlighting voices of the people. I found four major themes
surrounding both Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s performance on Twitter: condemning the
degradation of the U.S., acting as an immigration warrior, putting “America first,” and
developing an “America for all.”
Condemning the degradation of the U.S. was a natural occurrence throughout OcasioCortez and Trump’s individual performances of populism, but it varied in its manifestation
between the left and right-wing politicians. Ocasio-Cortez considered the issue at hand to be the
result of racism and white supremacy, presenting in the form of the subsequent inhumane
treatment of immigrants at the border and across the country. To Ocasio-Cortez, the U.S.’s
values as a nation of immigrants that is open to all who come to fulfill their American dream was
being diminished. Likewise, for Trump the degradation presented itself through an “immigration
crisis” and the nation’s inability to preserve “American” culture and the safety of its citizens
through incompetent policies by the Democrats. Additionally, both politicians acted as and
portrayed themselves as an immigration warrior. Trump positioned himself as the one true savior
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of a broken immigration system that could only be fixed through his administration’s excellent
border policies that are good for the overall wellbeing of the country and beneficial to its
citizens. Whereas Ocasio-Cortez showcased herself as a warrior for immigrants themselves,
fighting for their rights and humane treatment, but also for the country’s values and status as a
nation of immigrants. Another theme that pertained only to Trump’s performance was putting
“America first,” which consisted of the belief he was acting on the will of ‘the people’ and
protecting the U.S. from criminal immigrants. To Trump, being for immigrants and their rights
mean being anti-American and taking away from U.S. citizens. The final theme, which presented
itself only in Ocasio-Cortez’s performance was that of developing an “America for all.” She does
this through her use of highly inclusive rhetoric expressing a need for unity and inviting
immigrants to become part of ‘the people.
Throughout these four themes, both Ocasio-Cortez and Trump exhibited several
behaviors to center ‘the people.’ While each of the four methods of centering ‘the people’ were
present in these findings, it’s important to note that styling self on and speaking to ‘the people’
were the main methods used by Trump and Ocasio-Cortez as it pertained to immigration.
Speaking to ‘the people’ consisted of retweeting to disseminate information and news to their
followers, retweeting to highlight their own voices and rhetoric, and using data to emphasize
their policies and arguments – Trump for protecting the country from illegal immigrants, and
Ocasio-Cortez for promoting an “America for all.” For Ocasio-Cortez it also included
incorporating Spanish to engage in targeted communication. Engaging with ‘the people’ included
showing engagement with immigrants at the border through photos and videos, but only in
Ocasio-Cortez’s case. The Congresswoman used these interactions to tell immigrant stories on
her massive platform. Trump did not engage with ‘the people’ in relation to immigration. Styling
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oneself on ‘the people’ consisted of displaying emotion and compassion for Ocasio-Cortez, and
moral outrage for Trump. Styling self was perpetuated by Trump’s exclusionary rhetoric for an
America for Americans, and Ocasio-Cortez’s inclusionary rhetoric for an inclusive U.S. Finally,
highlighting the voices of the people included retweeting verified accounts on Twitter to
showcase support for not only themselves, but their policy positions as well.
The above findings support what we know of right-wing exclusionary rhetoric in Trump
but expand our understanding of left-wing inclusionary rhetoric and how it differs from its
counterpart through Ocasio-Cortez’s performance of populism and centering ‘the people.’ Most
of what we know of left-wing populism is thanks to studies on Latin American and European
movements, which characterize this brand of populism as being inclusive to marginalized outgroups, such as immigrants. However, though Latin American and European left-wing populists
speak of immigrants in inclusionary terms, they are still deemed “other.” In Ocasio-Cortez’s
case, she consistently demonstrates inclusionary rhetoric toward immigrants because of the
U.S.’s somewhat unique history and identity as a nation of immigrants, and specifically invites
this out-group to become active participants of ‘the people’ due to their economic and cultural
value.
In terms of immigration, both Ocasio-Cortez and Trump display basic tenets of populism
as being anti-establishment (Canovan, 2005). However, in Trump’s case he is transferring blame
of the broken immigration system on the Democrats. To him, the establishment is the Democrats
and Congress who have failed to “fix the crisis,” and he presents himself as the savior of the
system. On the other hand, Ocasio-Cortez views the establishment as the Trump administration
and the Republicans in power, who are failing immigrants by caging them in inhumane
conditions. However, even though Trump and Ocasio-Cortez are populist in the sense that they
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call for a political change of structure between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite,’ this case study
complicates our understanding of populism as being simply ‘anti-establishment.’ Although she is
speaking ‘for the people’ in an attempt to unite the masses, her method of doing so involves the
uplifting of an unlikely voice in the U.S. – that of immigrants coming to fulfil their American
dream. While most populists tend to draw on purely human emotion to drive policy and unite
‘the people,’ Ocasio-Cortez often used data and hard evidence in addition to appeals to emotion
to communicate her points. The perception is that she treats her audience as being driven by
facts, but also as human beings affected by inhumane treatment and human rights violations.
Ocasio-Cortez’s performance of populism can be simultaneously an appeal to emotion and an
appeal to facts. On the other hand, Trump’s performance of populism attempts to unite the
masses by uplifting the voices of the perceived marginalized group of U.S. Americans who need
protecting from immigrants. Like Ocasio-Cortez, Trump uses statistics and hyperbole to
communicate the necessity for his policies, such as the border wall. The perception here is that
his audience is driven by fear.
Baldwin-Philippi (2018) points out that during the 2016 election campaign, President
Trump ‘broke with traditional campaign practice, often retweeting and responding to littleknown supporters who had few followers or were otherwise not known to the public’ (p. 6).
Back then, this sometimes led to ethical political errors for Trump, such as retweeting known
racists, bots, and anti-Semites (Abramson, 2017), as his retweets were often fear-based and
exclusionary. Though as president, Trump did not retweet or respond to unverified users on
Twitter when communicating about immigration, and neither did Ocasio-Cortez. However, both
Trump and Ocasio-Cortez utilized retweets to show that they had support for their ideas and
were credible on the issues of immigration.
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This study’s findings align with the argument made by other scholars that populism,
particularly the conservative kind, is often based on the rhetoric of exclusion. This means that
not only are they voicing the narrative of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite,’ but also of ‘us’ against
some kind of ‘other,’ such as immigrants, people of certain cultures or faiths, etc. This type of
populism attempts to unite ‘the people’ against a common enemy. We see this manifest in
Trump’s performance of populism on Twitter, as he frames immigrants as a crisis and dangerous
criminals. What we see with Ocasio-Cortez is that her rhetoric is not only highly inclusive, but it
actually frequently focuses on highlighting the voices of marginalized communities within the
U.S., such as immigrants and refugees. Ocasio-Cortez also frequently and explicitly urged her
audience to act on behalf of immigrants experiencing inhumane treatment at the southern border,
sharing acts of solidarity and fundraising pages too. This adds to our understanding of populism
by demonstrating how politicians can use populist tactics to unite ‘the people’ not against an
enemy, but rather for a cause. This case study suggests that a more pragmatic approach that
views populism as strategic communication may be more productive than a normative approach,
allowing us to understand populism as a tool that may be utilized by politicians of varying party
affiliations to drive their political agendas through connection to their audience. Basically,
populism is not one size fits all.
Strengths and Limitations
While this case study challenges our current ways of thinking about the performance of
populism, in that it can be performed across the political spectrum with both exclusionary and
inclusionary rhetoric, it is not without its limitations. As the only coder of Trump and OcasioCortez’s tweets, the results are subjective and could benefit from more diverse perspectives. This
is particularly true due to the subject of the case study. As a white, U.S. American-born citizen,
there may certainly be aspects of the state of immigration that have not occurred to me as it has
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not relevant to my personal life experience. Therefore, this study could benefit from the
perspectives of Latinx researchers or immigrants.
Another challenge that presented itself throughout the study was the emotional and
mental toll associated with examining Trump and Ocasio-Cortez’s tweets on the immigration
crisis. This was particularly salient in the case of Ocasio-Cortez’s performance of populism as
she made more direct references to the humanitarian issues and human rights violations
occurring at the hands of the U.S. government, oftentimes sharing photo and video evidence to
accompany her statements and testimony of others. These instances were especially heinous
given the fact that most of these tweets were in reference to the suffering of children. By
focusing on the issue of immigration and the crisis happening at the border, I unintentionally
made myself susceptible to burnout when analyzing my findings.
Future Research
Though this study expands what we know of how left-wing politicians perform populism
on social media by using inclusionary rhetoric, further research is necessary to fully understand
left-wing populism given the single issue examined here. Future researchers should examine the
performance of populism on social media in relation to other important issues, such as climate
change or the economy. Researchers should also look to ‘the people’s’ reactions to this
performance of populism using content analysis studies to examine replies to politicians’ tweets
to understand the perceptions of the performance of populism on social media. This could be
done by comparing replies and reactions to President Trump’s conservative use of populism and
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s democratic-socialist use of populism (as they are frequently
compared but on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum [Baker, 2019; Zito, 2019]), or
broadening the analysis to other U.S. or non-U.S. populists. This study could further our

55

understanding of the disparities between left and right-wing populism and how it is perceived on
social media, as well as explore the role that populism and social media have on politics in
today’s increasingly digitized society. Another way to extend this study would be by performing
comparative studies between politicians from different countries, to examine the differences and
similarities between parties, cultures, and countries. Immigration is a hot-topic across the globe,
and we could benefit by further research beyond a U.S. American-centric perspective. As
populism is a global phenomenon, we need to understand if what we are seeing happen to
politics in the U.S. with Trump and Ocasio-Cortez and social media is being reflected elsewhere
around the world.
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Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Populist
political communication: Toward a model of its causes, forms, and effects. In T. Aalberg,
F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist political
communication in Europe (pp. 12–25). London: Routledge.
Republican National Committee. (2020). Immigration. https://www.gop.com/issue/immigration/
Roberts, K. M. (2006). Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin
America. Comparative politics 38(2), 127-148.
Rubio, A. (2011). Undocumented, not illegal: Beyond the rhetoric of immigration coverage.
NACLA Report on the Americas, 44(6), 50-52.
Salmela, M., & von Scheve, C. (2018). Emotional dynamics of right- and left-wing political
populism. Humanity & Society, 42(4), 434-454.
Savage, D. G. (2019, November 23). DACA timeline: The rise and resilience of the ‘Dreamers’
program. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-1112/timeline-on-daca
70

Schear, M. D., Haberman, M., Confessore, N., Yourish, K., Buchanan, L., & Collins, K. (2019,
November 2). How Trump reshaped the presidency in over 11,000 tweets. The New York
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitterpresidency.html
Schor, E. (2019, September 26). Trump administration proposes historically low refugee limit.
Associated Press. https://apnews.com/86909101dde746bfb7395bf9f47fda8e
Shattell, M. M., & Villalba, J. (2008). Anti-immigration rhetoric in the United States: Veiled
racism? Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 29(5), 541-543.
Shoichet, C. E. (2019, April 5). ‘Zero tolerance’ a year later: How the US family separations
crisis erupted. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/04/us/immigrant-familyseparations-timeline/
Siddiqui, S. (2018, November 17). The Democratic blue wave was real. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/16/the-democratic-blue-wave-was-real
Silva, D. (2018, December 31). Alleged abuse of migrant children at Arizona shelter referred to
prosecutors for possible charges. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/alleged-abuse-migrant-children-arizona-shelter-referred-prosecutors-possiblecharges-n953426
Sinha, S. (2017). Fragile hegemony: Social media and competitive electoral populism in India.
International Journal of Communication. 11, 4158-4180.
Smith, A. (2018, November 26). Trump demands Mexico send migrants back to countries of
origin after border patrol fires tear gas. NBC News.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-asks-mexico-send-migrants-backcountries-origin-after-border-n939966
Smith, M., & Bogado, A. (2018, June 20) Immigrant children forcibly injected with drugs at
Texas shelter, lawsuit claims. The Texas Tribune.
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/20/immigrant-children-forcibly-injected-drugslawsuit-claims/
Southern Poverty Law Center. (2019, February 19). Hate groups reach record high.
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/02/19/hate-groups-reach-record-high
Sraders, A. (2018, July 5). What is nationalism? Its history and what it means in 2018. The
Street. https://www.thestreet.com/politics/what-is-nationalism-14642847
71

Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The
case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119-142.
Stewart, J., Mazzoleni, G., & Horsfield, B. (2003). Conclusion: Power to the media managers. In
The media and neo-populism, ed. Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart and Bruce
Horsfield, 217-236. Westport: Praeger.
Stier, S., Posch, L., Bleier, A., & Strohmaier, M. (2017). When populists become popular:
comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and German political
parties. Information, Communication & Society. 20(9), 1365-1388.
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University press.
Tauberg, M. (2018, December 6). Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Trump, and the social media
playbook. Medium. https://medium.com/@michaeltauberg/trump-of-the-left2e8c4e0a79d2
Taylor, P. (2016, January 27). The demographic trends shaping American politics in 2016 and
beyond. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/27/thedemographic-trends-shaping-american-politics-in-2016-and-beyond/
The Statue of Liberty – Ellis Island Foundation, Inc. (n.d.a). The new colossus. Liberty Ellis
foundation. https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/the-new-colossus
The Statue of Liberty – Ellis Island Foundation, Inc. (n.d.b.) Immigration timeline. Liberty Ellis
foundation. https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/immigration-timeline
The Week Staff. (2016, June 5). A brief history of American isolationism. The Week.
https://theweek.com/articles/627638/brief-history-american-isolationism
Thomas, E. (2019, August 19). White supremacy and white nationalism have re-entered our
political conversation. But what do they mean? ABC News.
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-supremacy-white-nationalism-entered-politicalconversation/story?id=64998396
Thomas, E., & Cruz, A. (2019, August 9). More 2020 Democrats calling Trump a ‘white
supremacist.’ ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/2020-democrats-calling-trumpwhite-supremacist/story?id=64885082
Thompson, D. (2018, February 2). How immigration became so controversial. The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/why-immigration-divides/552125/

72

Tobocman, S., & Austin, J. (2019, October 20). How Democrats can turn immigration into
Trump’s kryptonite. Politico Magazine.
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/20/trump-democrats-immigration2020-229863
Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (n.d.). Tweets [Twitter profile]. Retrieved January 1, 2020,
from https://www.twitter.com/realdonaldtrump
Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016, June 22). Hillary says things can't change. I say they
have to change. It's a choice between Americanism and her corrupt globalism.
#Imwithyou [Tweet].
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/745693029089034240?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2016%2F11%2F15%2Fus%2Fpoliti
cs%2Fglobalism-right-trump.html
United Nations. (2019). International migrant stock 2019 [Data set]. United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division.
https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/international-migrant-stock2019.html
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2018, October 15). Border Patrol History.
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history
Vaccari, C., & Valeriani, A. (2015). Follow the leader! Direct and indirect flows of political
com- munication during the 2013 Italian general election campaign. New Media &
Society, 17(7), 1025–1042.
Waisbord, S. (2013). Vox populista. Buenos Aires: Gedisa.
Warren, R. (2019, January 16). U.S. undocumented population continued to fall from 2016 to
2017, and visa overstays significantly exceeded illegal crossings for the seventh
consecutive year. Center for Migration Studies. https://cmsny.org/publications/essay2017-undocumented-and-overstays/
Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American
politics. Comparative Politics 34(1), 1-22.
Williams, P. (2019, October 11). Judge rules Trump violated the law on wall funding with
national emergency. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/judgerules-trump-violated-law-wall-funding-national-emergency-n1065216
73

Winberg, O. (2017). Insult politics: Donald Trump, right-wing populism, and incendiary
language. European Journal of American Studies. 12(2), 1-15.
Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., ..., Schemer, C. (2016).
The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research
design for analyzing populist political communication. Working Paper 88 of the NCCR
Democracy at the University of Zurich.
Wolf, R. (2018, April 25). Travel ban timeline: 17 months, three versions, two appeals courts,
one Supreme Court. USA Today.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/25/trump-travel-ban-timelinesupreme-court/547530002/
Yates, J., & Murphy, C. N. (2019, May 22). Globalism is under siege. Here’s how to save it —
and why. The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/22/globalism-is-under-siege-hereshow-save-it-why/
Yglesias, M. (2018, November 13). Democrats’ blue wave was much larger than early takes
suggested. Vox. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/13/18082490/bluewave
Zhou, L. (2018, November 7). It’s official: A record-breaking number of women have won seats
in Congress. Vox. https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/11/7/18024742/midterm-results-record-women-win
Zito, S. (2019, January 26). Trump and Ocasio-Cortez use the same tricks to win at politics. New
York Post. https://nypost.com/2019/01/26/trump-and-ocasio-cortez-use-the-same-tricksto-win-at-politics/
Zoppo, A., Proenca Santos, A., & Hudgins, J. (2017, February 14). Here's the full list of Donald
Trump's executive orders. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/here-s-full-list-donald-trump-s-executive-orders-n720796

74

APPENDICES
APENDIX A
A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Policies and Events (2017 – 2019)
by Buzzfeed News, December 27, 2018. Last Updated on January 8, 2019.

2017
January 20
Donald J. Trump is inaugurated as the 45th president.
January 25 Setting ICE loose:
Trump signs Executive Order 13768 to punish sanctuary cities and sets up an office to track
crimes by immigrants. (The order’s provisions regarding sanctuary cities are later declared
unconstitutional.) Trump also signs Executive Order 13767 calling for the “immediate
construction” of his long-promised border wall. (Building the wall requires congressional
approval.)
January 27 Travel Ban 1.0:
Executive Order 13769 is almost immediately blocked by numerous federal judges.
February 13 RAISE Act is introduced in the Senate:
The bill seeks to limit the number of immigrants admitted to the US. (The bill, opposed by
Democrats – who will control the House in 2019 – is unlikely to pass.)
February 20
The Department of Homeland Security establishes the Victims of Immigration Crime
Engagement Office to highlight and assist victims of crimes committed by undocumented
immigrants.
March 6 Travel Ban 2.0:
Executive Order 13780 is announced. The Supreme Court allows the order to go into effect
temporarily.
June 15 Deferred Action for Parents of Americans is rescinded:
An Obama-era plan to shield millions of documented parents from deportation was stalled in the
courts before implementation – and the Trump administration rescinded it. An estimated 3.6
million people would have been eligible, according to the Migration Policy Institute.
July – October
DHS starts a “pilot program” for the zero-tolerance policy in El Paso, Texas.
September 5
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Attorney General Jeff Sessions announces the repeal of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
affecting nearly 690,000 people. The repeal is blocked by federal courts after 15 states and the
District of Columbia file a lawsuit.
September 12 Clearing the way for the wall:
DHS announces it will waive “certain laws” to begin construction of the new wall near Calexico,
California. The first section of fence was dedicated on Oct. 26, 2018.
September 12 Travel Ban 3.0:
Presidential Proclamation 9645 is announced, adding Venezuela and North Korea to the list of
affected countries, making it not exclusively a ban on Muslims. The Supreme Court would
uphold the ban on June 26, 2018.
September 27
The US announces it will accept only 45,000 refugees, down from 84,995 with regional caps of
19,000 for Africa, 17,500 for the Near East and South Asia (including most Middle Eastern
countries), 5,000 for East Asia, 2,000 for Europe and Central Asia, and 1,500 for Latin America
and the Caribbean.
October 11
The US ends temporary protected status for 450 Sudanese people
October 31
Sayfullo Saipov, an immigrant from Uzbekistan who entered the US under a special visa
program, kills 8 and injures 11 on a Manhattan bike path in a terror attack.
November 20
Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768 – withholding federal grants to sanctuary cities – is
declared unconstitutional.
December 15
The US ends temporary protected status for 2,550 Nicaraguans.
2017 ICE STATS*
143,470 administrative arrests. 142,356 detentions. 226,119 interior and border removals.
*ICE statistics based on fiscal year 2017, which includes the final four months of Obama’s administration.

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
250,838 apprehensions made at the southwest border.

2018
January 8
The US ends temporary protected status for 195,000 Salvadorans and 50,000 Haitians.
January 9
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A US district court temporarily blocks the repeal of the DACA program, allowing nearly
690,000 undocumented immigrants to renew their work permits. Days later, the Justice
Department appeals the ruling.
January 11
Trump in the Oval Office, according to the Washington Post: “Why are we having all these
people from shithole countries come here? Why do we need more Haitians? Take them out.”
February 13
The US District Court for the Eastern District of New York orders the federal government to
accept DACA applications from people who had previously applied.
February 23
Trump’s statement (determined to be false) at the Conservative Political Action Conference in
Oxon Hill, Maryland: “This guy came in through chain migration and a part of the lottery
system. They say 22 people came in with him. In other words, an aunt, an uncle, a grandfather, a
mother, a father, whoever came in. But a lot of people came in. That’s chain migration.”
February 26
The Supreme Court declines to hear the Trump administration’s request for a review of lower
courts’ orders that DACA applications must be accepted.
Late March
A caravan of more than 1,000 people, mostly from Honduras, begins its journey to the US from
Tapachula, Mexico.
April 2
The Justice Department announces quotas for immigration judges to complete cases faster. The
Trump administration says it expects 700 cases completed with a 15% appeal rate each year.
April 2
Trump tweets: “As ridiculous as it sounds, the laws of our country do not easily allow us to send
those crossing our Sothern Border back where they came from. A whole big wasted procedure
must take place. Mexico & Canada have tough immigration laws, whereas ours are an Obama
joke. ACT CONGRESS.”
April 4
As the caravan continues toward the US, Trump signs a memo to deploy “anywhere from 2,000
to 4,000” National Guard troops to the US-Mexico border.
April 6 Making zero-tolerance official:
Attorney General Jeff Sessions directs federal prosecutors “to adopt immediately a zerotolerance policy for all offenses” related to the misdemeanour of illegal entry to the US.
April 24
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A US district court orders the Trump administration to continue accepting new DACA
applications but gives the Department of Homeland Security 90 days to explain why the program
is being cancelled.
April 26
DHS terminates temporary protected status for Nepal, affecting about 8,950 people.
May 4
DHS terminated temporary protected status for Honduras, affecting about 57,000 people.
Honduras becomes the sixth country to lose the status since Trump took office.
May 7
Attorney General Jeff Sessions announces that the administration will prosecute parents who
enter the US illegally with their children: “If you cross this border unlawfully… then we will
prosecute you. If you smuggle an illegal alien across the border, then we’ll prosecute you…. If
you’re smuggling a child, then we’re going to prosecute you, and that child will be separated
from you, probably, as required by law.”
May 8
DHS proposes a new rule allowing authorities to investigate the legal status of anyone offering to
sponsor an unaccompanied migrant child in US custody.
May 16
Trump during a roundtable discussion about California’s sanctuary law: “We have people
coming into the country, or trying to come in – and we’re stopping a lot of them – but we’re
taking people out of the country. You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t
people. These are animals. And we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s
never happened before. And because of the weak laws, they come in fast, we get them, we
release them, we get them again, we bring them out. It’s crazy.
May 26
Trump tweets: “Put pressure on the Democrats to end the horrible law that separates children
from there parents once they cross the Border into the U.S. Catch and Release, Lottery and Chain
must all go with it and we MUST continue building the WALL! DEMOCRATS ARE
PROTECTING MS-13 THUGS.”
June 11
Attorney General Jeff Sessions says domestic violence is not grounds for asylum: “Generally,
claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”
June 14 Tent city becomes operational:
The Department of Health and Human Services says it received grant funds of $15 million for 30
days to detain children separated from parents at the border in a tent city near Tornillo, Texas.
June 20 Family separation policy reversed:
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Trump signs an abruptly drafted executive order to keep detained immigrant families together.
June 24
Trump calls for anyone entering the US illegally to be deported without due process: “We cannot
allow all of these people to invade our Country. When somebody comes in, we must
immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they came…”
June 26 Travel Ban 3.0 is upheld by the Supreme Court:
Writing for the court’s 5-4 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts says Trump has authority under
the Immigration and Nationality Act to “suspend entry of aliens into the United States.”
July 26
A federal judge orders the Trump administration to stop separating most families at the border
and to reunite parents and children who were already separated.
August 3
A US district court orders the Trump administration to reinstate DACA and says the Department
of Homeland Security failed to “give a rational explanation for its decision” to end it.
August 24
Trump Tweets: “Open borders equals crime, tremendous crime. The hardest kind of crime.”
September 14
The tent city in Tornillo, Texas, begins expanding to 3,800 beds after the Office of Refugee
Resettlement announces up to $368 million in additional funded to expand capacity and keep the
shelter running through 2018.
September 24
The US announces it will accept only 30,000 refugees in 2019.
October 3
A federal judge stops the Trump administration from ending temporary protected status for
Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
Mid-October
The caravan of about 1,600 Hondurans heads toward the US.
October 24
Trump tweets: “We are a great Sovereign Nation. We have Strong Borders and will never accept
people coming into our Country illegally!”
October 30
Trump says he intends to end birthright citizenship.
November 25

79

US border officials shoot tear gas and pepper balls at asylum-seekers at the Tijuana border
crossing.
December 11
Trump tweets: “Despite the large Caravans that WERE forming and heading to our Country,
people have not been able to get through our newly built Walls, makeshift Walls & Fences, or
Border Patrol Officers & Military. They are now staying in Mexico or going back to their
original countries…”
December 11
The Trump administration asks the Supreme Court to let the federal government bar asylum
claims by people entering the country without authorization.
December 12
The Atlantic reports: “The Trump administration is resuming its efforts to deport certain
protected Vietnamese immigrants who have lived in the United States for decades – many of
them having fled the country during the Vietnam War.”
December 13
At this point, nearly 15,000 migrant children are held in government custody.
December 13
Customs and Border Protection acknowledges that a 7-year-old girl died Dec. 8 just hours after
she was taken into custody by Border Patrol agents in New Mexico.
December 19
A federal court overturns the Trump administration’s limits on asylum claims for domestic and
gang-related violence.
December 11 The US Government Partially Shuts Down:
The Senate unanimously passes a bill to fund the government, however because it lacks the $5,7
billion needed to fund a border wall, the bill is not taken up by the Republican-controlled House.
Approximately 800,000 government employees are either working without pay or were placed
on unpaid leave.
December 24
An 8-year-old boy being held by Border Protection dies on Christmas eve.
2018 ICE STATS
158,581 administrative arrests. 396,448 detentions. 256,085 interior and border removals.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
415,868 apprehensions made at the southwest border (through November)

2019
January 3
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Democrats take over the House of Representatives and immediately pass a bill to fund the
government, which the Senate refuses to vote on.
January 8
In a television address, Trump is expected to make a case for a national security crisis at the
southwest border and the necessity of building a wall to separate the US and Mexico.
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APPENDIX B
U.S. Immigration Timeline
by History.com, December 21, 2018. Last Updated on May14, 2019.

White People of 'Good Character' Granted Citizenship
January 1776
Thomas Paine publishes a pamphlet, “Common Sense,” that argues for American independence.
Most colonists consider themselves Britons, but Paine makes the case for a new American.
“Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America. This new world hath been the
asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe,” he
writes.
March 1790
Congress passes the first law about who should be granted U.S. citizenship. The Naturalization
Act of 1790 allows any free white person of “good character,” who has been living in the United
States for two years or longer to apply for citizenship. Without citizenship, nonwhite residents
are denied basic constitutional protections, including the right to vote, own property, or testify in
court.
August 1790
The first U.S. census takes place. The English are the largest ethnic group among the 3.9 million
people counted, though nearly one in five Americans are of African heritage.

Irish Immigrant Wave
1815
Peace is re-established between the United States and Britain after the War of 1812. Immigration
from Western Europe turns from a trickle into a gush, which causes a shift in the demographics
of the United States. This first major wave of immigration lasts until the Civil War.
Between 1820 and 1860 the Irish—many of them Catholic—account for an estimated one-third
of all immigrants to the United States. Some 5 million German immigrants also come to the U.S.,
many of them making their way to the Midwest to buy farms or settle in cities including
Milwaukee, St. Louis and Cincinnati.
1819
Many of newcomers arrive sick or dying from their long journey across the Atlantic in cramped
conditions. The immigrants overwhelm major port cities, including New York, Boston,
Philadelphia and Charleston. In response, the United States passes the Steerage Act of 1819
requiring better conditions on ships arriving to the country. The Act also calls for ship captains to
submit demographic information on passengers, creating the first federal records on the ethnic
composition of immigrants to the United States.

1849
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America’s first anti-immigrant political party, the Know-Nothing Party forms, as a backlash to
the increasing number of German and Irish immigrants settling in the United States.
1875
Following the Civil War, some states passed their own immigration laws. In 1875 the Supreme
Court declares that it’s the responsibility of the federal government to make and enforce
immigration laws.

Chinese Exclusion Act
1880
As America begins a rapid period of industrialization and urbanization, a second immigration
boom begins. Between 1880 and 1920, more than 20 million immigrants arrive. The majority are
from Southern, Eastern and Central Europe, including 4 million Italians and 2 million Jews.
Many of them settle in major U.S. cities and work in factories.
1882
The Chinese Exclusion Act passes, which bars Chinese immigrants from entering the U.S.
Beginning in the 1850s, a steady flow of Chinese workers had immigrated to America.
They worked in the gold mines, and garment factories, built railroads, and took agricultural jobs.
Anti-Chinese sentiment grew as Chinese laborers became successful in America. Although
Chinese immigrants make up only 0.002 percent of the United States population, white workers
blame them for low wages.
The 1882 Act is the first in American history to place broad restrictions on certain immigrant
groups.
1891
The Immigration Act of 1891 further excludes who can enter the United States, barring the
immigration of polygamists, people convicted of certain crimes, and the sick or diseased. The
Act also created a federal office of immigration to coordinate immigration enforcement and a
corps of immigration inspectors stationed at principle ports of entry.

Ellis Island Opens
January 1892
Ellis Island, the United States’ first immigration station, opens in New York Harbor. The first
immigrant processed is Annie Moore, a teenager from County Cork in Ireland. More than 12
million immigrants would enter the United States through Ellis Island between 1892 and 1954.
1907
U.S. immigration peaks, with 1.3 million people entering the country through Ellis Island alone.
February 1907
Amid prejudices in California that an influx of Japanese workers would cost white workers
farming jobs and depress wages, the United States and Japan sign the Gentlemen’s Agreement.
Japan agrees to limit Japanese emigration to the United States to certain categories of business
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and professional men. In return, President Theodore Roosevelt urges San Francisco to end the
segregation of Japanese students from white students in San Francisco schools.
1910
An estimated three-quarters of New York City’s population consists of new immigrants and firstgeneration Americans.

New Restrictions at Start of WWI
1917
Xenophobia reaches new highs on the eve of American involvement in World War I. The
Immigration Act of 1917 establishes a literacy requirement for immigrants entering the country
and halts immigration from most Asian countries.
May 1924
The Immigration Act of 1924 limits the number of immigrants allowed into the United States
yearly through nationality quotas. Under the new quota system, the United States issues
immigration visas to 2 percent of the total number of people of each nationality in the United
States at the 1890 census. The law favors immigration from Northern and Western European
countries. Just three countries, Great Britain, Ireland and Germany account for 70 percent of all
available visas. Immigration from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe was limited. The Act
completely excludes immigrants from Asia, aside from the Philippines, then an American
colony.
1924
In the wake of the numerical limits established by the 1924 law, illegal immigration to the
United States increases. The U.S. Border Patrol is established to crack down on illegal
immigrants crossing the Mexican and Canadian borders into the United States. Many of these
early border crossers were Chinese and other Asian immigrants, who had been barred from
entering legally.

Mexicans Fill Labor Shortages During WWII
1942
Labor shortages during World War II prompt the United States and Mexico to form the Bracero
Program, which allows Mexican agricultural workers to enter the United States temporarily. The
program lasts until 1964.
1948
The United States passes the nation’s first refugee and resettlement law to deal with the influx of
Europeans seeking permanent residence in the United States after World War II.
1952
The McCarran-Walter Act formally ends the exclusion of Asian immigrants to the United States.
1956-1957
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The United States admits roughly 38,000 immigrants from Hungary after a failed uprising
against the Soviets. They were among the first Cold War refugees. The United States would
admit over 3 million refugees during the Cold War.
1960-1962
Roughly 14,000 unaccompanied children flee Fidel Castro’s Cuba and come to the United States
as part of a secret, anti-Communism program called Operation Peter Pan.

Quota System Ends
1965
The Immigration and Nationality Act overhauls the American immigration system. The Act ends
the national origin quotas enacted in the 1920s which favored some racial and ethnic groups over
others.
The quota system is replaced with a seven-category preference system emphasizing family
reunification and skilled immigrants. Upon signing the new bill, President Lyndon B. Johnson,
called the old immigration system “un-American,” and said the new bill would correct a “cruel
and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American Nation.”
Over the next five years, immigration from war-torn regions of Asia, including Vietnam and
Cambodia, would more than quadruple. Family reunification became a driving force in U.S.
immigration.
April-October 1980
During the Mariel boatlift, roughly 125,000 Cuban refugees make a dangerous sea crossing in
overcrowded boats to arrive on the Florida shore seeking political asylum.

Amnesty to Illegal Immigrants
1986
President Ronald Reagan signs into law the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, which grants amnesty to more
than 3 million immigrants living illegally in the United States.
2001
U.S. Senators Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) propose the first Development,
Relief and Education of Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which would provide a pathway to legal
status for Dreamers, undocumented immigrants brought to the United States illegally by their
parents as children. The bill—and subsequent iterations of it—don’t pass.

2012
President Barack Obama signs Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) which
temporarily shields some Dreamers from deportation, but doesn’t provide a path to citizenship.
2017
President Donald Trump issues two executive orders—both titled “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”—aimed at curtailing travel and immigration from
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six majority Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia) as well as North
Korea and Venezuela. Both of these travel bans are challenged in state and federal courts.
2018
In April 2018, the travel restrictions on Chad are lifted. In June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court
uphold a third version of the ban on the remaining seven countries.
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APPENDIX C
Keywords Used in Data Collection
1. Immigration

15. Border patrol

2. Immigrant

16. Deportation

3. Border

17. Deport

4. Border crisis

18. Migrant

5. Mexico

19. Detainee

6. Mexicans

20. Detention center

7. Illegal alien

21. Humanitarian crisis

8. Refugee

22. Inhumane

9. Undocumented

23. Cages

10. Asylum

24. Caging

11. Illegal immigrant

25. Concentration camp

12. ICE

26. Human rights

13. DHS

27. Child separation

14. CBP

28. Family separation

87

APPENDIX D
Copyright Permission Letter

August 7, 2019
Dear Dr. Jessica Baldwin-Philippi:
I would like to request your permission to include an excerpt from the following item in my
dissertation:
Baldwin-Philippi, J. (2018). The technological performance of populism. New Media and Society
21(2), 376-397.
Your populist affordances model and methods of ‘centering the people’ were the framework for
my thesis. I would like to include a figure of the model because it will be very helpful for context
on the technological performance of populism. The source will receive full credit in the
manuscript.
By agreeing to the use of the item in my dissertation, you give ProQuest Information and
Learning (PQIL) the right to supply copies of this material on demand as part of my doctoral
dissertation. Please attach any other terms and conditions for the proposed use of this item.
If you no longer hold the copyright to this work, please indicate to whom I should direct my
request.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. Sincerely,
Taylor P. Koopman
taylor.p.earl@wmich.edu

Copyright Permission Approval
Hi Taylor, Sure that's totally fine with me. I'd check with NM&S's guidelines about if you have
to ask/cite them in any particular way, but it's fine on my end. Glad you found it so helpful, and
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